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Abstract
While ‘individuality’ is regarded as a cultural construct, this article argues that 
its trans-cultural investigation has hardly begun, both empirically and theoreti-
cally. Comparative work to date has been confined to euro-centric approaches. 
South Asian models of the individual, though amongst the earliest on record, 
have not been taken seriously as credible alternatives to European models, other 
than under the label of ‘ethnosociology’. The present article seeks to redress the 
balance, by offering a sociological reconstruction of the classical concept of the 
individual in Jaina philosophy and of its social implications. It argues that previ-
ously opaque aspects of the dualistic conception of individuality of the Jainas can 
be freshly understood, and analysed, with the help of the sociological concepts 
of G. Simmel and N. Luhmann, which in turn are interpreted as variations of 
broader transcultural themes.
Keywords: Ātman, Equality, Individual, Dividual, Renunciation, Alienation, Hier-
archy, Nāma-karman, Jainism, Vyakti, Self, Action, Person, Quantification, Dilthey, 
Dumont, Luhmann, Mannheim, Marriott, Simmel, Weber
It is believed that religion is something that has to do with an individ-
ual. But in reality it also concerns society. It may be practised individu-
ally but it leaves its effect on society (Mahaprajna 1987: 41).
Jainism has been characterised by both E. Durkheim and L. Dumont 
as a ‘religion of the individual’ in contrast to caste Hinduism which, 
1. Research for this article was funded through a Fellowship at the Max 
Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies, University of Erfurt 2012–
2013. It is an outcome of the DFG funded Research Group Religious Individualisation 
in Historical Perspective and has benefitted from discussions with friends and col-
leagues at the Max-Weber-Kolleg and the responses to the circulation of a first draft 
at the conference ‘Religious Individualization in Historical Perspective’ (Eisenach, 27 
June 2017). All unattributed translations in the text are the author’s.
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rightly or wrongly, was categorised as a ‘religion of the group’. The 
article addresses the question, what kind of individualism Jainism 
promotes by reviewing relevant models of types of individualisa-
tion and offering a new sociological interpretation of the Jaina con-
cept of the individual based on an elaboration on the supposition of 
W. Dilthey (1889 GS IV: 559) that ‘the structure of the soul contains 
the schema, the framework as it were, for all historical processes 
that emerge from the interaction of psychic entities’,2 and vice versa, 
and that these structures could be investigated by means of descrip-
tive psychology and historical hermeneutics, based on the analysis 
of socially prevalent models of the soul or realtypes and the con-
struction of idealtypes,3 which highlight shared properties of sym-
bolic expression.4 Dilthey’s approach was sociologically refined in 
the works of his immediated disciples Simmel (1890), Scheler (1924) 
and Mead (1934), which in turn influenced the theories of individ-
uality and the social construction of the self of Mannheim (1925), 
Elias (1933) and Luhmann (1964, 1984, 1989), as well as Bourdieu 
(1980). Durkheim (1912/1915: 402) also broadly claimed that ‘the 
idea formed of the soul reflects the moral state of the society’. Yet, 
his group-psychological approach was not offering any tools for 
investigating the hypothesis further.5 In the field of Indian Sociology 
Marriott (1976: 109) argued, in the words of Dumont (1980: xxxvi), 
2. ‘Die Struktur des Seelenlebens enthält in sich das Schema, gleichsam das 
Gerüst für alle aus dem Zusammenwirken seelischer Einheiten entstehenden 
geschichtlichen Vorgänge’ (Dilthey 1889/1921 GS IV: 559).
3. See Dilthey (1896: 295f., 312) on the significance of symbolic expressions and 
varieties of typological analysis. With reference to Dilthey’s (GS VII: 84f.) critique 
of psychologism, Habermas (1986/1979: 186f.) criticises the ‘romantic‘ thesis of a 
simple inside/outside distinction, which is evident in parts of Dilthey’s oeuvre, by 
pointing to the fact that ‘Erleben selber durch symbolische Zusammenhänge struk-
turiert ist’ (experience itself is structured by symbolical connections). 
4. A clear exposition of the typological method, neither Dilthey’s nor Weber’s, 
was presented by Hempel und Oppenheim 1936: 83f., etc. See also Russell (1908).
5. In contrast to positivistic theories of the social origins of self-concepts in the 
wake of Nietzsche (1887), Cassirer (1932/2007: 24) highlighted the philosophical 
origin of rational concepts of the soul at the hand, for instance, of Condillac’s (1754) 
famous thought-experiment of the marble-statute that is incrementally vitalised by 
adding the senses one by one, thus apparently demonstrating that the individual 
soul is a composite of the ur-element of sensation, Arguably, a similar reductionist 
method is used in Jaina philosophy. As the state of Hobbes is composed of individ-
ual wills, and the soul of Condillac by individual sensations, so is according to the 
karman-reductionism of the Jainas the living body an aggregate of the subjective 
consequences of individual actions.
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that ‘what happens within one actor is by nature not much differ-
ent from what happens between actors’. Dumont acknowledged 
that this notion ‘shows a genuine structuralist viewpoint’, but high-
lighted that ‘the relation between such features […] and the social 
morphology has yet to be worked out’. The article analyses evidence 
from the Jaina tradition to indicate ways in which types of social 
differentiation and types of individualisation can be related by way 
of a concept of the individuality of the person as a social form,6 that 
is, in the terms of Luhmann (1991/2008: 142), an ‘individually attrib-
uted limitation of possibilities of conduct’. It is argued in this arti-
cle that different models of individuality both reflect and negatively 
determine distinct semantic and social spaces of applicability and 
hence in their selectivity reflect and project generalised properties 
of social structure.7 
It is a sociological truism that ‘individuality’ is a cultural con-
struct.8 Yet, trans-cultural investigation of the different concepts and 
aspects of individuality has hardly begun, both empirically and the-
oretically.9 Most published comparative work to date is confined to 
6. Unless otherwise indicated, in the following, the concept of the (human) 
individual is used in a non-technical sense as the designation of a biological entity, 
in contrast to social constructions such as individuality and individualism. Alter-
natively, ‘self-consciousness’ could be chosen as an initial point of entry, as in the 
theory of Luhmann (1997).
7. See Luhmann (1991/2008: 143, 148 n. 16) on the reasons for distinguishing 
between ‘person’ (individualised) and ‘role’ (generalised). Note that the difference 
to Bourdieu’s concept of a as it were unmediated  reproduction of social structural 
properties in individual dispositions.
8. Luhmann (1997: 1016).
9. On the tendency toward amalgamation of terms such as ‘human being’, 
‘body’, ‘mind’, ‘self’, ‘subject’, ‘ego’, ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘individual’, ‘person’, and their non-
English language equivalents in the modern academic literature in the sociologi-
cal literature, see Weber (1904-5), Lukes (1971: 45, 1973). Luhmann (1991/2008: 137) 
explained the terminological confusion and ‘amalgamation’ of the terms ‘human 
being’, ‘subject’, ‘individual’, and ‘person’ with the ubiquitous post-Kantian ten-
dency, to define ‘individuality’ via ‘self-reference’, which renders older substance-
philosophical conceptions obsolete. Instead, he noted, the distinction between ‘I’ and 
‘Me’, respectively designating the psychic and the social identity of the individual 
took hold. Evidence for the aggravation of the problem in the anthropological litera-
ture, taking into account non-western concepts, can be found in a volume on The Cat-
egory of the Person edited by Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1986), symptomatic in the 
title of the key article of Mauss (1938, 1986), and in the following summary remarks 
of Spiro (1993: 143) (cf. p. 114): ‘[T]he critical term “self” is virtually never defined 
in these studies, and because, moreover, it is often conflated or confused with such 
concepts as self-representation, individual, person, personality, it is often difficult 
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euro-centric approaches.10 South Asian models of the individual, for 
one, have not been taken seriously as credible alternatives, other 
than under the label of ‘ethnosociology’.11 One aim of the present 
article is to redress the balance, to an extent, by offering a sociolog-
ical reconstruction of the principal conceptualization of individual-
ity in Jaina philosophy and of its social implications. It argues that 
previously opaque aspects of the conception of individuality of the 
Jainas can be freshly understood, and analysed, by comparison with 
the sociological models of the individual of G. Simmel and N. Luh-
mann, which in turn are interpreted as variations of broader trans-
cultural themes. The argument is presented in three parts. First, 
relevant ideas from the sociology of the individuality in Europe and 
in South Asia are discussed. Second, an analytical reconstruction of 
the Jaina concept of the individual is offered, and contrasted with 
to apprehend the entity to which this term refers’. ‘If, following Hartman (1964), 
we distinguish between “person” and “self”—“person” referring holistically to the 
psycho-sociobiological individual, ‘self’ to the individual’s own person—then, typi-
cally, anthropologists (and comparative social psychologists) do not investigate the 
self or the individual’s conception of his self (the self-representation), but the cul-
tural conception of the person. They mostly arrive at this conception by investigat-
ing some set of cultural symbols of a social group, from which they infer its cultural 
conception of the person, although in a few instances they do so by means of various 
experimental tasks. Finally, most of these studies assume that cultural conceptions 
of the person are isomorphic with the actors’ conceptions of the self, and some also 
assume that they are ismorphic with the actors’ mental representations of their self, 
and with their self itself’ (Spiro 1993: 117).
10. The sociology of the individual in South Asia remains deeply indebted to 
the European classics of Durkheim (1893, 1912); Weber (1904–1905, 1916–17, 1922); 
Freud (1907, 1912, 1923); Heidegger (1927) and the exegetical tradition. The widely 
discussed models of Weber (1916–17), Dumont (1966) and Marriott (1976) have not 
yet been replaced and remain of fundamental importance, despite perceptive criti-
cism by Béteille (1986) and others. Their focus lies, however, on selected textual 
paradigms and empirical case material selected primarily from the world of Brah-
manism and /or of Buddhism. Typical for studies on individuality in Buddhist Stud-
ies is the replication of the doctrinal focus on de-individualisation, as reflected in the 
titles of works by authors such as Collins (1982) or Siderits (2003). Notable studies 
on individuality in Jaina Studies, such as Butzenberger (1993), focus almost entirely 
on philosophy and narrative literature. The Sociology of Jainism is still in its infancy, 
especially theoretically informed studies are extremely rare and hardly any work 
has been done on the relationship between models of personality structure and 
social structure. Exceptional is the study of Goonasekera (1986), which is strongly 
influenced by Freud and Weber, through mediation of Spiro (1970) and Obeyesekere 
(1976).
11. See Marriott’s 1989 work on ‘Hindu sociology’, which gave a (pseudo-) emic 
spin to Thurnwaldt’s (1931–34) original etic definition of the term ‘Ethnosoziologie’.
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Vedic and Buddhist conceptions. Finally, the social functions of the 
Jaina doctrine in the South Asian context are reconsidered, and the 
consequences of the proposed interpretation of the Jaina concept of 
the individual as a social form for sociological theory discussed, not 
least for M. Weber’s binary ideal types of ‘inner-worldly-asceticism’ 
and ‘other-worldly asceticism’ and L. Dumont’s binary of the ‘indi-
vidual inside-the-world’ and the ‘individual outside-the-world’.
The Individual and its Parts
Semantic changes of the concept of the ‘individual’ in modern Euro-
pean history are well documented and researched. In Luhmann’s 
(1997: 1020f.) view,12 the ‘modern’ distinction inside/outside that 
replaced the traditional social distinction above/below was mainly 
intended to produce a ‘pure’ notion of ‘individuality of the indi-
vidual’, which identifies the individual at once with humanity at 
large, in order to conceptually ‘dissolve’ the concept of ‘society’.13 
The problem was that because individuality was instantly identi-
fied with universality in this construction, the empirical specificity 
of the individual had lost all significance. Because it is impossible to 
deduce a concept of ‘social order’ from the metaphysical qualities 
of pure individuality, the only remaining options open for a theo-
retical construction of a ‘society of subjects’ or of ‘inter-subjectivity’ 
seemed to be ‘paradoxical’ transcendental-theoretical constructions, 
such as theories of social contract, shared transcendental substance, 
or mutual reflexion, which all abstract from the empirical conscious-
ness of the individual (p. 1027f.).14
The central question addressed in this article is how a virtually 
identically framed theoretical problem is addressed by the Jaina 
12. His studies on ‘individuality’ invariably refer to Simmel, and to Dumont, at 
least by implication.
13. ‘Die Figur des Subjekts hatte die Funktion, die Inklusion aller in der Gesell-
schaft durch Appell an die Selbstreferenz eines jeden zu begründen—also weder 
gesellschaftstheoretisch noch empirisch. […] Die Regulierung der Inklusion bleibt 
den Funktionssystemen überlassen. Die Generalformel dafür muß entsprechend abs-
trahiert werden. […] “Der Mensch” ist jetzt Individuum und Menschheit zugleich’ 
(Luhmann 1997: 1025).
14. ‘Man muß jetzt erklären, wie soziale Ordnung trotz der individuellen Sub-
jektivität der Menschen möglich ist—sei es durch einen Gesellschaftsvertrag, sei es 
durch wechselseitige Reflexion, sei es durch eine allen gemeinsame “transzenden-
tale” Residualsubstanz. Aus diesen Annahmen ergibt sich aber nicht mehr eine The-
orie der Gesellschaft’ (Luhmann 1997: 1021).
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metaphysics of the soul, which in a way similar to European nat-
ural law theories identifies not only the individual human being 
but all living creatures with pure consciousness, and consequently 
envisages the ideal society to be a collection of independent enti-
ties that are qualitatively equal and mutually reflect one another by 
way of self-reference. It will be argued that the way in which Jaina 
theory conceives of empirical sociality with the help of a dynamic 
model of the living being as an internally differentiated entity whose 
structure of dispositions reflects the results of past interactions and 
informs future interactions compares favourably with contempo-
rary sociological models of the ‘person’ or of the ‘habitus’ as a (yet 
imperfectly modelled) structure that is said to mediate between the 
‘pure individual’ and ‘empirical society’. The comparison will dem-
onstrate that the supposedly uniquely ‘modern’, ‘western’, origi-
nally ‘greco-christian’ problematic of the individual is not unique 
at all, but reflected in ancient philosophical traditions across the 
globe. This was clearly sensed by M. Weber in his pioneering com-
parative work on the social impact of soteriologies. Weber’s thesis 
evidently benefitted from the sociological insights of G. Simmel,15 
whose prior work on the relationship between social and individ-
ual differentiation provides key ideas for the argument proposed 
here, that the Jaina model of the living individual being (vyakti), its 
immortal individual soul (ātman or jīva) and atomic physical parts 
(nāma-karman) produced by constitutive processes, actions, that 
dis-/connect soul and matter (pudgala),16 is not merely of salvific or 
psychological significance, but in the main represents a social form, 
whose theoretical understandig from a comparative point of view is 
of general sociological significance. The exercise requires first of all a 
formal model abstract and refined enough to enable a translation of 
the conceptual structures of European and Indic theories of the indi-
vidual without unduly imposing etic preconceptions.17 It is argued 
15. ‘During the critical years of intellectual gestation preceding publication of 
his essay on the Protestant Ethic, Weber was led to some insights from Simmel’s writ-
ings. In the judgment of their gifted young contemporary György Lukacs, Weber’s 
achievement in the sociology of culture “was possible only on the foundation created 
by Simmel”’ (Levine 1971: xlv). See also Habermas (1986/1996: 411). 
16. For a detailed exposition see Glasenapp (1915) and Schubring (1935). 
17. Mannheim’s (1929/1988: 234ff.)  kindred idea that a model of a higher con-
vertibility and commensurability is needed to translate semantic structures gener-
ated from different standpoints is criticised by Luhmann (1980: 12f.) for its adherence 
to the concept of ‘objective truth’.
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that the Dilthey-Simmel hypothesis, positing a homology between 
the structure of the ‘soul’, that is, the psyche of the individual, and 
the structure of social differentiation, however mediated by seman-
tics, is a useful starting point for the development of a model that 
explains the peculiar social selectivity that is built into Jaina meta-
physics of the individual.
Simmel (1901) highlighted the difference between two princi-
pal concepts of the individual:18 A literalist ‘quantitative’ concept of 
the individual as an ‘indivisible’ entity, postulated by 18th century 
enlightenment thinkers, and a ‘qualitative’ concept of the individ-
ual as a ‘unique specimen’ or ‘dividual’ promoted by thinkers of the 
romantic and historicist schools.19 In the former, the emphasis is on 
identity and equality and in the latter on difference and unity. The 
problem was how to conceptualise the relationship between the two, 
one predicated on the scholastic theory of definition and Linnaen 
classification and the other culminating in the Darwinian theory of 
population development via individual variation and natural selec-
tion.20 In the 19th century, the opposition between ‘individual’ and 
‘society’, which had set the process of conceptual ‘exclusion’ of the 
‘individual’ from ‘society’ in motion,21 was increasingly abandoned 
under the impact of Hegelian, Marxist and Darwinian evolutionary 
models. The trend culminated in the work of Simmel (1890)22 and 
Durkheim (1893), who indicated ways in which individualisation 
18. He avoided the use of ‘person’, which has legal implications. 
19. On dividuality, a term that after its Fichtean heydays (an individual can only 
observe itself by dividing itself into subject and object) has become fashionable again 
ever since it was employed by Deleuze (1990/1992: 5) to refer to duplication in elec-
tronic control systems, while Simmel (1890/1989a: 291f.) and Luhmann (1984/1995: 
625/461) highlighted the connective potential of money, ‘the dividuum par excel-
lence, which can adapt to every in-dividuality’, see lately Fuchs (2003), Raunig (2015) 
and in particulat Ott (2015: 63), who focuses on the problem of conceptualising the 
internal complexity of the ‘atomic’ singular living being, including ‘die ungedach-
ten Verhältnisse des Ineinanders zwischen taxonomisch und diskursiv geschiedenen 
Größen, zwischen menschlichen Lebewesen, Mikroorganismen und gesellschaftli-
chen Gefügen und ihren konstitutiven Praktiken’. See also the increasing number of 
anthropological publications in the wake of the work of Fortes (1971), Marriott (1976) 
and Strathern (1988).
20. Simmel (1908: 768f.), Luhmann (2002/2006: 248).
21. Luhmann (1989: 158).
22. Levine’s (1971: xiv) delimitation of three distinct periods in Simmel’s work is 
hard to accept in toto given that, in substance, the arguments of his 1890 treatise Über 
soziale Differenzierung, influenced by ‘social Darwinism’, are repeated in the Soziologie 
of 1908.
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and social integration can be conceived as interrelated aspects of 
one and the same simultaneous process of progressive social differ-
entiation and individualisation driven by the economically moti-
vated trend toward a division of labour. What remained unresolved 
was the question, how the gaping contradiction between the pro-
gressive functional specialisation of labour, reducing individuals to 
performers of single tasks, and the democratic ideals of the moral 
autonomy and rights of the individual as an incarnation of ‘human-
ity’ can be harmonised.23 Different answers have been put forward, 
none of them entirely convincing, least of all Durkheim’s straight-
forward correlation of the division of labour with an increase in 
‘organic’ solidarity and morality.24 More realistic was the analysis 
of Marx (1867), who diagnosed structural hiatus between formal 
autonomy and equality and substantive heteronomy and inequality 
in modern society.
Following cues of his teacher Dilthey (1889), whose descriptive 
psychology and historical hermeneutics effectively revived Plato’s 
postulate that the structure of the soul and the structure of society 
are related, albeit only indirectly, through the mediation of institu-
tions and systems of symbols, Simmel (1890/1989a: 284)25 addressed 
the question how in modern capitalist society social structure and 
the structure of the individual is empirically linked by developing a 
theory of a psycho-social parallelism, so to speak, arguing that pro-
cesses of social differentiation are reflected in processes of internal 
differentiation of the individual, not one-by-one, but structurally.26 
23. Dumont (1966/1980: 11) pointed out that ‘this individualistic tendency […] 
was in fact accompanied by the modern development of the social division of labour’. 
He contrasted the normative concept of the autonomous individual of the enlight-
enment with the perspective of empirical sociology: ‘Opposed to the self-sufficient 
individual it opposes man as a social being; it considers each man no longer as a 
particular incarnation of abstract humanity, but as a more or less autonomous point 
of emergence of a particular collective humanity, of a society. To be real, this way of 
seeing things must, in the individualistic universe, take the form of an experience, 
almost a personal revelation, and this is why I speak of “sociological apperception”. 
This the young Marx wrote, with the exaggeration of a neophyte: “it is society which 
thinks in me”’ (5): ‘this ideally autonomous man was in actual fact the most depen-
dent of his kind, tightly enclosed in an unprecedented extension of the division of 
labor’ (p. 237).
24. Luhmann (1977/1992: 24).
25. On Simmel’s critique of Dilthey’s concept of history and his own focus on 
selectivity and binary opposites see Levine (1971: xxii, xxxv).
26. Even Spann (1914/1923: 120) rejects the idea of a direct influence of society 
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Accepting the observation of Marx that there are limits to functional 
differentiation, threatening social solidarity altogether, he regarded 
it as the ‘duty of culture’ to arrange tasks in such a way that the 
demands of the social division of labour and the desires of individ-
uals for the development of specialised capacities are matched, to 
an extent, by way of compatible degrees of differentiation. From a 
logical point of view, processes of social differential and of individ-
ual differentiation can be directly complementary only to the degree 
that the desires and abilities of the individual match the demands of 
society. Yet, this perspective does not take account of the desire of 
the individual to maintain or to develop a ‘well-rounded personal-
ity’, that is, to pursue a multitude of desires beyond specialised tasks 
paid for by a labour market that, more than any other social system, 
progressively dissects the individual into isolated, mutually uncon-
nected functions.27
Simmel argued that in reaction to external pressures towards 
functional specialisation, the individual is forced to develop cor-
responding forms of internal differentiation through the advance 
of individual capacities and desires that match the multifarious 
demands of the social circles it is associated with or the opportu-
nities opened up by the individual itself. In order to counteract the 
resulting tendency toward fragmentation and to maintain a sense 
of unity the individual has only one option left, that is, the rejec-
tion of the plurality of its differentiated ‘one-sided’ desires and 
functions through acts of self-reference that regenerate a sense of 
unity through renunciation of attachment and desire to particu-
lar contents.28 In other words, according to Simmel, the tendency 
on the individual, and speaks only about a semantic homology: ‘eine innere Entspre-
chung der geistigen Inhalte’.
27. Cf. Young’s (1958) critique of the meritocracy as a ‘new’ form of class-society, 
Luhmann’s (1964/1999: 26) indication of the factual disjunction of the needs of the 
social system and personal needs in modern society, and Luhmann’s (1984/1995: 
364f./269f.) later theory of individuality as ‘Anspruch’ (claim, aspiration or entitle-
ment) (a conservative topos, which is also prefigured in the work of Simmel 1913: 
118f.): ‘One can therefore read the situation of the claim from the semantics of merit 
(Verdienst, mérite). Stratified societies already manipulate this relationship. They 
infer the merits of higher strata from their claims, and merit can already be seen in 
the fact that the higher strata lead a corresponding good (noble) life’.
28. ‘Dem gegenüber [the division of labour] bedeutet die Differenzierung des 
Individuums gerade das Aufheben der Einseitigkeit; sie löst das ineinander der 
Willens- und Denkfähigkeit auf und bildet jede derselben zu einer für sich bestehen-
den Eigenschaft aus. Gerade indem der Einzelne das Schicksal der Gattung in sich 
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of internal differentiation that is oriented toward the segregation of 
parts can only be counteracted through an opposite tendency of dif-
ferentiation that is re-oriented toward the whole, that is, a hierarchi-
cal form of differentiation between the levels of part and whole, 
through distanciation of the whole from the parts. The irreducible 
tension beween the two tendencies Simmel describes as one beween 
differentiation in succession (Differenzierung im Nacheinander), of 
manifest contents and actions, and differentiation in coexistence 
(Differenzierung im Nebeneinander),29 of latent sedimented disposi-
tions and potentialities;30 a distinction which he analogises by way 
of a conscious reduction of complexity with binaries such as ‘labour 
and capital’ and ‘action and potency of the soul’.31 Theoretically con-
flicting tendencies between external social integration through spe-
cialisation and internal personal integration through totalisation are 
ideally resolved through the psychological compartmentalisation of 
dispositions, of will, emotion and thought, while a sense of unity 
is retained through self-reference and distanciation from the parts, 
so that only certain functions, but not the individual as a whole are 
instrumentalised by processes of social reproduction in a function-
ally differentiated society.32 The required mental acts of renunci-
ation, acts of ‘innerworldy asceticism’ as Weber would call them, 
represent a reaction to systemic pressures. 
wiederholt, setzt er sich in Gegensatz zu diesem selbst. Die Mannichfaltigkeit scharf 
gesonderter Inhalte, die das Ganze verlangt, ist nur herstellbar, wenn der Einzelne auf eben 
dieselben verzichtet’ (Simmel 1890/1989a: 284, emphasis added).
29. See the semiotic distinction between ‘syntagmatic’ and ‘paradigmatic’ rela-
tionships.
30. ‘Hier erzeugt das Differenzierungsstreben, indem es sich einerseits auf das 
Ganze, andererseits auf das Teil bezieht, einen Widerspruch, der das Gegenteil von 
Kraftersparnis ist. Und ganz analog sehen wir auch innerhalb des Einzelwesens die 
erwähnte Differenzierung vom Nacheinander in Konflikt mit dem Nebeneinander 
geraten. Die Einheitlichkeit des Wesens […] wird von starken Trieben unserer Natur 
selbst um den Preis der Einseitigkeit verlangt und damit jene primäre Kraftersparnis 
erzielt, die in der einfachen Ablehnung aller Vielheit liegt; dem gegenüber steht der 
Trieb nach mehrfacher Bewährung, allseitiger Entfaltung, und bewirkt die sekun-
däre Kraftersparnis, die in der Geschmeidigkeit vielfältiger Kräfte, in der Leichtig-
keit des Übergangs von einer Anforderung des Lebens zu anderen liegt’ (Simmel 
1890/1989a: 287).
31. Simmel (1890/1989a: 294).
32. Marx tended to critically highlight that the heart and soul of the total indi-
vidual is bought on the labour market for the mere price of a particular function.
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Simmel (1890/1989a: 287) pointed out that only ‘strong characters’ 
are ever likely to have the energy to restrain impulses that do not 
precisely match the demands of a given social situation or to shape 
situations themselves by developing additional capabilities. In his 
view, the logical problem boils down to the unavoidable contradic-
tion between the simultaneous existence of multiple desires and the 
need of sequencing their satisfaction in time. But even ‘strong char-
acters’ are unlikely to assemble all the capabilities within themselves 
that would enable them to fulfil the entirety of their desires or to 
totalise themselves by replicating the entire structure of social differ-
entiation within their own personality or by intellectually grasping 
the whole of existence. Not even through Bildung can the personal-
ity structure of the individual be perfectly aligned with the (social) 
universe. A solution of the Problem der allseitigen Befriedigung must 
be sought elsewhere.
Effectively this requires the development of a ‘split’ personality 
structure, combining a stable psychological core with variable spe-
cialised functions. In the words of Simmel (1908: 757/1971: 288): 
‘individuals are not just the sums of their attributes, in which event 
they would be as diverse as those; rather, beyond those attributes, 
each of them is an absolute entity by virtue of personality, free-
dom and immortality’.33 At this point philosophical ‘worldviews’ 
play a significant role. According to Simmel, the experience of con-
tinuity in change is the empirical background upon which theories 
of self or soul were developed. The solution of the problem of the 
(re-)totalisation of the fragmented lives of individuals in societies 
dominated by an elaborated division of labour he saw in the devel-
opment of cultural models motivating the distinction between fea-
tures of character that remain relatively unchanged over a period of 
time and features that are variable. In his view, religious conceptions 
33. Stern (1911/1921: 505f.) echoes Dilthey’s and Simmel’s ultimate ‘personal-
ism’ as well, the dualistic conception of the individual as a multiplex sum of attri-
butes and as a unitary form: ‘Allerdings: die Person ist unitas MULTIPLEX, nicht 
punktuelle Einfachheit; den Versuch, ihr Wesen und ihre individuelle Eigenart aus 
einer einzigen psychischen Kategorie heraus zu verstehen, würde ich nach wie vor 
für aussichtslos halten. Aber ebenso unmöglich ist es, jemals aus einem Mosaik noch 
so fein herausgearbeiteter Elemente allein das Bild der Persönlichkeit zu gestalten; 
deshalb muß man allen psychographischen Bestrebungen, wenn sie mehr als eine 
Ansammlung von bedeutungslosen Einzeltatsachen sein wollen, von vornherein 
eine Strukturauffassung, die gemeinsame Beziehung zu einem einheitlichen Zweck-
gebiet persönlichen Lebens und eine Sonderung nach Wesentlichkeit und Unwe-
sentlichkeit zugrundelegen’.
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of the ‘soul’ as a substance (in the greco-christian context) proved 
particularly successful in this respect.34 Philosophical abstractions 
such as the soul/body distinction,35 however, do not operate in a 
34. ‘As the individual becomes more incomparable, as he come more and more 
to occupy—in his being, his conduct, his destiny—a position that can be filled only 
by him and that is reserved for him alone in the organization of the whole, all the 
more must this whole be grasped as a unity, as a metaphysical organism in which 
each psyche is a vital element, exchangeable with no other, but presupposing all 
others and their interaction for its own life. Wherever the need exists to perceive the 
totality of psychic existence in the world as a unity, it will soon be satisfied by an 
individuation in which single beings necessarily complement and need each other, 
each taking the place left for it by all the others; this need for unity and hence for 
the apprehension of the totality of being will sooner be satisfied by that than by an 
equality of beings in which any one could essentially replace any other, in which 
each member seems actually to be superfluous and without proper relation to the 
whole. 
Nevertheless, the idea of equality, which unifies, in quite another sense, the most 
extreme individualization with the most extreme expansion of the circle of associ-
ated beings, has never been more encouraged than by the Christian doctrine of the 
immortal and eternal soul. The soul that faces its god with reliance only upon itself 
in its metaphysical individuality, the only absolute value of all being, is identical to 
all others in what ultimately matters. For in the eternal and the absolute, there are no 
distinctions: men’s empirical differences, confronting the eternal and transcenden-
tal, are of no consequence. These individuals are not just the sums of their attributes, in 
which event they would be as diverse as those; rather, beyond those attributes, each of them is 
an absolute entity by virtue of personality, freedom and immortality. 
This, the sociology of Christianity, offers the greatest historical as well as meta-
physical example of the asserted correlation: the psyche that is free from all bonds 
and free from all relations, whatever the ends for whose sake they were instituted, 
the psyche that is only oriented to the powers beyond that are the same for every-
one—such a psyche, in conjunction with all others, constitutes a homogenous being 
that encompasses all sentience. Unconditionality of personality and unconditional 
expansion of the circle of its kind are but two expressions for the unity of this reli-
gious conviction. And insofar as this has become the metaphysics or the given mean-
ing for life in general, it is unmistakable in the extent to which it influences, as a 
priori disposition and mood, the historical patterns of relation among men and the 
attitude with which they approach each other’ (Simmel 1971: 287f., Original: Simmel 
1908: 756f., empasis added).
35. This is echoed by Luhmann (1989: 175f.), who, generally, regards soul/
body distinctions, like all distinctions, as forms of ‘reduction of complexity’: ‘Until 
the nineteenth century […] the concept of the individual was still a thing con-
cept, interpreted as the conceptual opposite to units that are complex and there-
fore can be dismantled. Its original etymological meaning governed the concept. 
Everything indivisible could be designated as an individual; the person as the 
indivisibility of rational substance was merely a special case. The indivisibility of 
the soul guaranteed its indestructibility, thus its immortality, and this explained 
why human beings had to answer for themselves at the Last Judgement. On this 
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vacuum. Their experiential basis and motivating force lies, accord-
ing to Simmel (1908: 760f.), in the feeling of ‘I-ness’ which individ-
uals with highly differentiated inner worlds operating in complex 
and ever changing social environments inevitably become more con-
scious of as a point of reference that remains relatively constant vis-
à-vis the experience of change.36 Simmel called this point of reference 
‘personal I’ or ‘personality’ (English translation: ‘ego’). He argues 
that in its observed function as a relativey stable point of reference 
for observation of contextually variable psychological content, a con-
scious sense of personal identity emerges only as the product of ret-
rospective self-objectification. Hence it is to be regarded as a sign of 
conceptual foundation, one could preach a religion and morality that constantly 
attempted to motivate human beings to act against their own interests’ (Luhmann 
1984/1995: 348f./257).
36. ‘Beyond the significance that expansion of the circle has for the differen-
tiation of the determinants of will, one sees its significance for the emergence of 
the sensation of a personal ego. Surely no one can fail to recognize that the style 
of modern life—precisely because of its mass character, its rushing diversity, its 
unbounded equalization of countless previously conserved idiosyncrasies—has 
led to unprecedented levelings of the personality form of life. But neither should 
one fail to recognize the counter-tendencies, much as these may be diverted and 
paralyzed in the joint effect that ultimately appears. Life in a wider circle and inter-
action with it develop, in and of themselves, more consciousness of personality 
than arises in a narrower circle; this is so above all because it is precisely through 
the alternation of sensations, thoughts, and activities that personality documents 
itself. […]. Personality is not a single immediate state, not a single quality or a 
single destiny, unique as this last may be; rather it is something that we sense 
beyond these singularities, something grown into consciousness out of their expe-
rienced reality. This is so even if this retroactively generated personality, as it were, 
is only the sign, the ratio cognoscendi of a more deeply unitary individuality that 
lies at the determinative root of the diverse singularities, an individuality that we 
cannot become aware of directly, but only as the gradual experience of these mul-
tiple contents and varieties. […] Now this alternation of the contents of the ego, 
which is actually what first poses the ego to consciousness as the stable pole in 
the play of psychic phenomena, is extraordinarily more lively within a large circle 
than it is for life in a smaller group. Stimulations of sensation, which are especially 
important for subjective ego consciousness, occur most where a highly differenti-
ated individual stands amidst other highly differentiated individuals, and where 
comparisons, frictions, and specialized relations release a profusion of reactions 
that remain latent in a narrower undifferentiated circle, but which in the larger 
circle by virtue of their abundance and diversity, elicit the sensation of the ego as 
that which is absolutely “one’s own”’ (Simmel 1971: 290f., Original: Simmel 1908: 
760f.).
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a psychologically ‘deeper homogenous individuality’37 that cannot 
be directly cognised.38
The development of the sense of a relatively stable personal ‘I’ is 
therefore for Simmel (1908: 761) a positive indirect effect of the frag-
mentation of the concrete individual into isolated aspects and their 
instrumentalisation by quantitatively enlarged social systems based 
on the social division of labour.39 The more only isolated aspects 
of the individual are defined as relevant for the social division of 
labour, the more the individual becomes potentially self-conscious 
and hence cognitively disembedded from its multifunctional social 
ties, and the freer it is to focus its attention on its own ‘individual 
interest’ in the creation of a sense of ‘individuality’, or ‘unity in dif-
ference’, itself.40 Simmel’s view that fragmentation of the individual 
into a single stable core and multiple variable functions can have a 
37. Cf. Dilthey’s distinction of two types of experience, the immediate Erleb-
nis and the reflected Erfahrung, and the ontological conviction of the irreducible 
individuality of living consciousness. Durkheim (1893: 216) also subscribed to the 
idea of an irreducible individuality of consciousness: ‘[I]l y a une sphère de la vie 
psychique qui, quelque développé que soit le type collectif, varie d’un homme à 
l’autre et appartient en propre à chacun: c’est celle qui est formée des représenta-
tions, des sentiments et des tendances qui se rapportent à l’organisme et aux états de 
l’organisme; c’est le monde des sensations internes et externes et des mouvements 
qui y sont directement liés. Celle première base de toute individualité est inaliénable 
et ne dépend pas de l’état social’.
38. Luhmann (1984/1995: 347ff./256ff.) contrasts sociological ‘individualistic 
reductionism’ with the fact of the ‘internal endlessness’ of the stream of conscious-
ness of ‘psychic systems’, which he defines as ‘autopoietical systems’, i.e., ‘systems 
that reproduce consciousness by consciousness’ (not: life): ‘By “consciousness” we 
do not mean something that exists substantially (as language constantly suggests), 
but only the specific operational mode of psychic systems’ (p. 355/262): ‘[I]ndividu-
ality cannot be anything other than the circular closure of this self-referential repro-
duction’ (p. 357/264).
39. ‘The more purely and completely this division of labor occurs—visible in 
the magnitude of the group’s enlargement—the more the individual is emancipated 
from the interactions and coalescences that it replaces, and the more he is left to his 
own centripetal concerns and tendencies’ (Simmel 1971: 292, Original: Simmel 1908: 
761f.). Cf. Luhmann’s notion (1984: 346) of psychic systems as part of the ‘environ-
ment’ of social systems.
40. ‘Thus, the differentiation of social organs does not mean that individuals are 
detached from their connections with the whole, but rather means that they devote 
only the substantively relevant parts of their personalities to those bonds. The point at 
which the individual momentarily touches the totality or the structure of the whole no 
longer pulls parts of his personality into the relationship that do not belong there. It is 
with social organs—the consequences and distinguishing characteristics of the growth 
of the group—that the involvements become dissolved wherein the individual has to 
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‘liberating’ effect for the individual clearly set him apart from Marx, 
and to some extent from Durkheim,41 who regarded ‘alienation’ and 
‘anomie’ respectively as negative states per se, in contrast to Hegel42 
and Husserl,43 who, like Simmel, characterised self-consciousness 
itself as a form of ‘alienation’.44 Luhmann (1964) effectively imported 
the entire argument of Simmel and made it his own.45
convey and yield to situations and activities elements of himself that do not belong to 
what he wants of himself’ (Simmel 1908/1971: 293, Original: Simmel 1908: 762).
41. And evidently even Luhmann (1989: 160, 170).
42. Hegel (1981 4: 385) defines the concept of alienation as the being-there of 
self-consciousness: ‘die wahre ursprüngliche Natur des Individuums ist der Geist 
der Entfremdung des natürlichen Seins’.
43. Husserl (1973: 442) elaborated Hegel’s idea in the following way: ‘Wie aber 
finde ich “mich” als Menschen? Nur in der Weise, dass ich meinen Leib irgendwo 
draussen im Raum denke, wie wenn es ein fremder Leib wäre, und in der Weise 
der Einfühlung. Nur wenn ich meinen Leib sozusagen entfremde und dann doch 
wieder als denselben ansehe, der mir wirklich gegeben ist in der einzigartigen 
Weise des zentralen Dingphänomens, um das sich alle Welt als äussere gruppiert, 
nur dann fasse ich mich als Menschen und lege in dieser mittelbaren psychophy-
sischen Apperzeption mein Ich als eingefühltes dem Leib ein. Ich findem ich selbst 
als Menschen auf dem Wegeüber eine Selbstentfremdung meines Leibes’.
44. In the words of Levine 1971: xlii-xliii: ‘For Simmel, the fragmentation of 
social life is liberating and gratifying, whereas the fragmentation of man’s experi-
ence of culture is frustrating. This is because social fragmentations promotes the con-
ditions for developing individuality, whereas cultural fragmentation both hinders 
and assists man’s self-deprivation’. See also Habermas (1986/1996: 411 n. 20).
45. ’Soziale Integration (von Handlungssystemen) und persönliche Integration 
(von Handlungssystemen) fallen stärker denn je auseinander. Damit ist nicht gesagt, 
daß der Mensch der sozialen Beziehung entraten und sich nur noch in der Einsam-
keit aufrecht halten könne. […] Der Mensch muß auf die Rationalisierung des sozi-
alen Systems mit eigenen Formen der Selbstrationalisierung und Selbstabstraktion, 
mit Vertagung von Gefühlen und Ausdrucksbedürfnissen parieren, durch neuartige 
Strategien des Selbstbewußtseins und vielleicht durch eine neuartige Ethik antwor-
ten, die mit „mehrfachen Systemreferenzen“ zu rechnen lernt und kompliziertere 
Formen der Koordination von bewußten Systeminteressen der Personen und der 
Sozialsysteme benötigt‘ (Luhmann 1964/1999: 26). See also Chapter 25-26 on ’emo-
tional and functional stabilisation‘ and ‘human beings and measures’, where Luh-
mann points to similarities between the functionalist perspective of ‘indifference’ as 
a form of freedom and eudaemonic philosophies in European antiquity (p. 381): ‘Der 
Mensch stellt der Organisation eine eigene Art von Selbstrationalisierung entgegen. 
[...]’ (p.  389).
Habermas’ (1973: 172, 176, 1986/1996: 412) verdict that by ratifying as fact 
the externally induced centrifugal de-centring of the ‘symbolical structure’ of 
‘I-identity’ of the ‘person’, as much as the ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ of Hork-
heimer and Adorno, ‘systems-functionalism has mutely sealed “the end of the indi-
vidual”’, ‘while letting the subjects themselves diffuse into systems’ is here missing 
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Simmel’s theory of the genesis of the two identities of the indi-
vidual, or rather two aspects of the individual’s self-identity, a sin-
gular personal identity and multiple social-functions, represents an 
ingenious sociological refashioning of Fichte’s (1794) theory of sub-
jectivity, conceived as a process of differentiation, set into motion by 
an observer, who, in the act of self-observation, draws a distinction 
within herself as both subject and object. By focussing on the self as 
a process rather than as a substance, Fichte was able to build upon 
Kant’s (1781) explanation of rational theories of the soul as reifica-
tions of more fundamental mechanisms. To fully express the para-
doxical nature of the self-referential process, Fichte was effectively 
forced to distinguished not just object and as subject but in addition 
between the subject as object and the subject as the encompassing 
reflexive process which posits the distinction, and so on, ad infini-
tum. Underhand not two but three perspectives had to be invoked.46 
Simmel faced exactly the same dilemma in his attempt to theoreti-
cally reconstruct the genesis of I-ness out of psychological pressures 
produced by social differentiation. In addition to the sum of empiri-
cal attributes and the sense of ‘I-ness’, he posited the theoreticsl exis-
tence a third ‘deeper homogenous individuality’ which draws and 
observes the distinction between the fomer two.47
By interpreting the structure of the internally differentiated attri-
butes of the individual as correlatives to the structure of external 
the point of Luhmann’s revival of Simmel’s original idea (only obliquely referred to 
via the inclusion of Simmel [1890] in the bibliography), which amounts to a defence 
of ‘psychic individuality’. See Raunig (2015: 205), by contrast, on the anthropological 
quest for antediluvian alternatives to the ‘reductive’ notions of ‘idiosyncratic-‘ and 
‘possessive individualism’.
46. Henrich (1966: 206) points out that according to Fichte (WW III, 1797) the 
I for itself constitutes a ‘dreistellige Relation: Etwas (1) stellt etwas (2) als etwas (3) 
vor.’ Luhmann (1984/1995; 373/276) concludes that ‘this theory leads to a kind of 
over-identification of the ego’ and suggests the system-theoretical concepts of self-
observation, self-description and self-simplifications as instruments for less abstract 
empirical analysis. 
47. Fechner (1860 I: 4f.) tried to resolve the dilemma of self-observation by 
taking recourse to a quasi-Jaina form of perspectivism: ‘Hiermit nun wird gleich 
selbstverständlich, wovon wir zuerst den Grund suchten, warum Niemand Geist 
und Körper, wie sie unmittelbar zusammengehören, auch unmittelbar zusammen 
erblicken kann. Es kann eben Niemand zugleich äusserlich und innerlich gegen 
dieselbe Sache stehen. […] Darum ist die Erscheinungsweise des Geistes stets auf 
Einmal nur Eine, weil es nur Einen inneren Standpunct giebt, indess jeder Körper 
nach der Vielfältigkeit der äusseren Standpuncte dagegen und der Verschiedenheit 
der darauf Stehenden vielfältig verschieden erscheint‘.
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social differentiation Simmel was able to translate the constitutive 
self-environment-relation of Diltheys descriptive psychology into 
a theory of the social constitution of the individual, using the pro-
cessual logic of Fichte’s subject philosophy implicitly as a frame. 
Accordingly, the ‘individual’ turned out to be a ‘di-vidual’ (even: 
tri-vidual), composed of (i) a universally evident psychological core, 
(ii) a set of historically differentiated attributes and dispositions, 
which in their unique combination distinguish the single individual 
from all others, and (iii) a reflexively constituted historical ‘self’ that 
in the process of self-distinction from its variable attributes perceives 
itself as a relatively stable core vis-à-vis its differentiated functions.
At the end of the new methodological postface of his treatise 
‘Group Expansion and the Development of Individuality’, which 
represented in the main an extract from the earlier work ‘Über sociale 
Differenzierung’, Simmel (1908: 774f.) made it clear that he had not 
sought to distinguish three components of individuality, but three 
‘methodological ‘perspectives’, ‘ideas’, or ‘aesthetical moods’, under 
which one and the same thing can be observed:48 individual, soci-
ety, and humanity. The perspectives of the individual (the unique 
or particular) and of humanity (the typical or universal) stand both 
against the perspective of society in so far as both relate to the indi-
vidual and allow the contingency of the social (within the individ-
ual) to come into view.49 The three perspectives correspond to the 
subject-philosophical perspectives of subject, object, and transcen-
dental subject.50
48. On the investigation of a phenomenon from different ‘aspects’ see, besides 
Fechner, Parsons (1951/1970: 6), who acknowledges Simmel (1937/1968: 772f).
49. ‘Just as within societal development the narrower, “more socialized” group 
attains its counterpart (internally or historically, on a cyclical or simultaneous basis) 
in that it expands to the larger group and is specialized to the individual element in 
society—so from this ultimate point of view society as a whole appears as a special 
form of aggregation beyond which, subordinating their contents to other forms of 
observation and evaluation, there stand the ideas of humanity and of the individual’ 
(Simmel 1908/1971: 39f., Original: Simmel 1908: 774f.).
50. ‘Der Konstruktionsfehler liegt in der Gleichsetzung von Subjektivität und 
Allgemeinheit und in der Zurechnung dieser Gleichsetzung auf das sich selbst 
gebende Bewußtsein. Individualität wird nicht individuell, sondern als das Allge-
meinste schlechthin gedacht, indem man auch in dieser Hinsicht Subjekt und Objekt, 
nämlich den Begriff des Individuellen (der selbstverständlich ein allgemeiner, alle 
Individuen bezeichnender Begriff ist) und die Individuen selber in eins setzt. Das 
macht jedoch im Prinzip jede Kommunikation überflüssig’ (Luhmann 1997: 1028).
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Dividuality
In response to the question posed by enlightenment philosophers 
about the nature of the relationship between individual and soci-
ety, Simmel rediscovered the society within the individual, not as a 
reflection of the whole, as in Durkheim’s (1912) theory of the soul or 
Spann’s (1914) concept of ‘part-wholes’.51 But, at first, as a set of spe-
cific capacities and desires that broadly match the specific demands 
of the social division of labour.52 Secondly, the development of a clear 
sense of self by way of inner detachment of the individual from its 
social functions. According to Luhmann (1984/1995: 373 n. 47/275 
and 561 n. 46) the ‘doctrine of the two identities’ is only a ‘theoreti-
cal artifact’, since ‘no individual identifies himself doubly in this 
way and no observer would be in a situation to keep the two identi-
ties separate’. These are only cultural attributions:53 
There is no ‘second I’, no ‘self’ in the conscious system, no ‘me’ vis-à-vis 
an ‘I’, no additional authority that examines all linguistically formed 
thoughts to see whether it will accept or reject them to see whether 
it will anticipate. All of these are theoretical artifacts induced by an 
understanding of discourse (or, in parallel, reflection) as an intentional 
activity (Luhmann 1984/1995: 368/272).
Yet, paradigmatically formulated by Durkheim,54 behaviouristically 
refined by Mead,55 enriched by the personality-model of Freud, and 
51. See Spann 1914, Koestler 1967.
52. On the different aspects of Simmel’s notion of ‘social differentiation’, partic-
ularly the distinction between division of labour and role-differentiation, see Müller 
(2011). 
53. The last point was already made by Durkheim (1893: 139 n. 1), and, in a dif-
ferent form, by Simmel (1908/1950: 201f.). See note 52.
54. ‘Or, ce qui fait notre personnalité, c’est ce que chacun de nous à de propre 
et de caractéristique, ce qui le distingue des autres. Cette solidarité ne peut donc 
s’accroitre qu’en raison inverse de la personalité. Il y a dans chacune de nos con-
sciences, avons-nous dit, deux consciences: l’une, qui nous est commune avec notre 
groupe tout entier, qui par conséquent n’est pas nous-même, mais la société vivant 
et agissant en nous; l’autre, qui ne représente au contraire que nous dans ce que nous 
avons de personnel et de distinct, dans ce qui fait de nous un individul.(1) [(1) Toute-
fois, ces deux consciences ne sont pas des régions géographiquement distinctes de 
nous-même, mais se pénétrent de tous côtés]’ (Durkheim 1893: 138f.).
55. ‘Das Individuum, das sozialisiert wird, lernt, sich selbst von sozialen Anfor-
derungen zu unterscheiden. Es doppelt sich in I und me, in personal und social iden-
tity. Es findet sich genötigt, mit sich selbst zu kommunizieren und jene Ganzheit 
zu werden, die es im fragmentarischen sprunghaften Verlauf seines eigenen Vor-
stellungslebens zunächst gar nicht ist. Simmel und Mead steuern hier die traditi-
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authoritatively summed-up in the socialisation theory of Parsons,56 
the theory of two identities of the individual still dominates sociol-
ogy to this day, notably in the sociologies of ‘embodiment’ and ‘the 
body’. This is the case, although research on the conditions of aug-
mentation of more individuality and more solidarity, following Dur-
kheim, was not carried out and, according to Luhmann (1984/1995: 
352/260), was ‘not even able to answer the questions of what an 
“individual” really is and how it enables itself under changing soci-
etal circumstances’:
[N]ow the difference between individual and society was situated 
within the individual as the difference between personal and social 
identity. George Herbert Mead is the standard reference for this. But 
even independently of Mead, it was accepted that individuality cannot 
be viewed as purely the individual’s own performance, thus not as 
mere self-reflection. Thereby one merely repeats the doubled para-
digm of individual and society within the individual, without clari-
fying which problems should be addressed. It cannot remain a mere 
‘both-and’. The ‘universal’ is reconstituted as the ‘social’; the world is 
given through others. This may be advantageous heuristically, but the 
question of how the I relates to the universal and how the I becomes 
universal are not carried a single step further by it. […]
An exception to this predominant theoretical pattern of a socially 
generalized but also de-individualized personal ‘identity’ [i.e., one 
that neglects the incomparability of individuals], is Talcott Parsons’s 
theory of general action systems. At first glance, it takes care to sepa-
rate clearly personal and social systems. In their own right, that is, in 
regard to other functions, both are subsystems of the general action 
system. Had Parsons raised the question of how the universal could 
exist in particular individuals, he would have answered that this was 
simply the universal’s contribution to the emergence of action. […] 
(Luhmann 1984/1995: 354/260).
Crucially, the social component of the individual was not consid-
ered as a psychological fact, but as a social fact by the theoreticians 
of social differentiation. Parsons (1951/1970: 17f.), who used the 
term ‘personality’ instead of the term ‘individuality’, distinguished 
onsbildenden Formulierungen bei—und blockieren damit zugleich Rückgriffe auf 
transzendentaltheoretische oder auf psychologische Bewußtseinsanalysen’ (Luh-
mann 1989: 152).
56. Universalist Freudian approaches (e.g. Spiro 1965, Spratt 1966) and the 
approaches of the so-called cultural personality school (cf. Kardiner 1939, 1944; 
Kluckhohn and Mowrer 1944; Spiro 1951, 1961, 1993; Singer 1961; Shweder 1979–180; 
Shweder and Bourne 1984 etc.), and of Bourdieu 1983, which can be read as more 
limited versions of the same paradigm, do not need to be discussed here.
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accordingly between a ‘basic personality structure’, matching the 
role structure of a social system, and idiosyncratic features, for 
which effectively the (hardly used) term ‘individuality’ is reserved. 
To bracket the two, he created the term ‘total personality structure’. 
Important are Parsons’s remarks on the mere homology57 of person-
ality structure and social structure, although he treats personality as 
a ‘system’ in itself:
Personality is the relational system of a living organism interacting 
with a situation. Its integrative focus is the organism-personality unit 
as an empirical entity. The mechanisms of the personality unit must be 
understood and formulated relative to the functional problems of this 
unit. The system of social relationships in which the actor is involved 
is not merely of situational significance, but is directly constitutive of 
the personality itself. But even where these relatonships are socially 
structured in a uniform way for a group of individuals, it does not 
follow that the ways in which these uniform ‘roles’ are structured are 
constitutive of each of the different personalities in the same way. Each 
is integrated into a different personality system, and therefore does 
not in a precise sense ‘mean the same thing’ to any two of them. The 
relation of personality to a uniform role structure is one of interdepen-
dence and interpenetration but not one of ‘inclusion’ where the prop-
erties of the alleged personality system are constituted by the roles of 
which it is allegedly ‘made up’. 
There are, as we shall see, important homologies between the 
personality and the social system. But these are homologies, not a 
macrocosm-microcosm relationship—the distinction is fundamental. 
Indeed, failure to take account of these considerations has laid at the 
base of much of the theoretical difficulty of social psychology, espe-
cially where it has attempted to ‘extrapolate’ from the psychology of 
the individual to the motivational interpretation of mass phenom-
ena, or conversely has postulated a ‘group mind’ (Parsons 1951/1970: 
17-18).58
Parsons would of course not have rejected descriptions of emic con-
cepts of microcosm-macrocosm-relation as reported in the conclu-
sion of the influential article of Fortes (1973) on ‘The Concept of the 
Person’ amongst the Tallensi that, written in the wake of the famous 
57. This is echoed by Spann (1914/1923: 120) and by Luhmann (1989: 181). Cf. 
Luhmann’s term ‘structural coupling’ (2005: 274), introduced ‘als Ersatzbegriff für 
den Begriff des Subjekts’.
58. The fact that intellectual history is relatively autonomous is commonly 
stressed, for instance by Carrithers (1986: 236f.) who uses the expression ‘roughly 
compatible’, to describe relations between the form of society and of the self, 
which, rather than offering a clear answer, may serve as starting point of a research 
programme.
232 Max Weber Studies
© Max Weber Studies 2018.
essay of Mauss (1938) with the subtitle ‘A Category of the Human 
Mind’:
Person is perceived as a microcosm of the social order, incorporating 
its distinctive principles of structure and norms of value and imple-
menting a pattern of life that finds satisfaction in its consonance with 
the constraints and realities (as defined by Tallensi culture) of the 
social and material world (Fortes 1973/1986: 286).
But sometimes, as for instance in Tambiah’s (1984: 48) claim that 
according to Buddhism in Thailand ‘from the trajectory of a single 
person’s existence is developed the network and tangle of the cosmos 
both in space and time’, emic perceptions are almost unnoticably 
merged with etic models. 
Like Simmel, Parsons (1951/1970) also argued that it would be a 
mistake ‘to treat social structure as a part of culture or to treat “social 
motivation” as […] a direct application of personality theory’. Rather, 
all three ‘systems’ are seen as epigenetic products of one and the 
same social process, the fundamental elements of which are ’actions’ 
in his theoretical model:
The correct formula is different. It is that the fundamental building 
stones of the theory of social systems, like those of personality and 
culture theory, are common to all the sciences of action. […] But the 
ways in which those conceptual materials are to be built into theo-
retical structures is not the same in the cases of the three major foci 
of action theory [Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology]. […] The 
common foundation is not the theory of the individual as the unit soci-
ety, but of action as the ‘stuff’ out of which both personality systems 
and social systems are built up’ (p. 18).
The indirect link between ‘personality’, ‘society’, and ‘culture’ are 
shared patterns that are, to an extent, structurally compatible:
There is a certain element of logical symmetry in the relations of the 
social system to culture on the one hand and to personality on the 
other, but its implications must not be pressed too far. The deeper sym-
metry lies in the fact that both personalities and social systems are types 
of empirical action systems in which both motivational and cultural 
elements or components are combined, and are thus in a sense parallel 
to each other. The basis of integration of the cultural system is, as has 
been noted, pattern-consistency plus functional adequacy of motiva-
tional balance in a concrete situation. A cultural system does not ‘func-
tion’ except as part of a concrete action system, it just ‘is’ (p. 17).
[W]e know that the fundamental common sector of personalities and social 
systems consists in the value-patterns which define role-expectations. 
The motivational structures thus organized are units both of personality 
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as a system and of the social system in which the actor participates; they 
are need-dispositions of the personality and they are role-expectations 
of the social system. This is the key to the ‘transformation formula’ 
between the two systems of personality and social system. […] This fun-
damental relationship between need-dispositions of the personality, 
role-expectations of the social system and internalized institutionalized 
value-patterns of the culture, is the fundamental nodal point of the orga-
nization of systems of action (Parsons 1951/1970: 540).
For Luhmann (1991/1995/2008: 141), who at first adopted, but 
subsequently rejected Parsons’ notion of the ‘personality system’, 
and his theory of a common form of structuration based on the 
model of multiple systemic functions of one and the same action,59 
the ‘person’ as social form is an attribution and as such part of the 
social system, not of the ‘human being’ as perceived in everyday life, 
which he associates either with the ‘biological system’ or with the 
‘psychic system’ somewhat analoguous to the older philosophical 
mind-body dualisms; as much as for Kelsen (1934/2008: 63f.), who 
in a chapter of the first edition of his work Pure Theory of Law titled 
The Dissolution of the Concept of the Person showed, in an almost iden-
tical way as Simmel (1908/1957: 205ff.) in his analysis of the relation-
ship between superordination and subordination, that the ‘person’, 
i.e., the ‘physical person’ and the ‘juridicial person’, is ‘merely a per-
sonified unitary expression for a bundle of legal duties and rights’.60
59. Luhmann (1964/1999: 389).
60. ‘“Person” […] [ist] nur ein personifizierender Einheitsausdruck für ein Bündel 
von Rechtspflichten und Berechtigungen’ (Kelsen 1934/2008: 63f.). Cf. D. Hume’s 
bundle theory.
‘[D]as Recht erfaßt den Menschen nicht in seiner Totalität, nicht mit allen seinen 
seelischen und körperlichen Funktionen. Es statuiert—als Pflicht oder Berechti-
gung—nur ganz bestimmte menschliche Akte. Mit anderen Worten: Der Mensch 
gehört der durch die Rechtsordnung konstituierten Gemeinschaft nicht zur Gänze, 
sondern nur mit einzelnen seiner Handlungen oder Unterlassungen an, soweit diese 
eben durch die Normen der Gemeinschaftsordnung geregelt werden. Nur so ist es 
möglich, daß ein und derselbe Mensch zugleich mehreren und voneinander ver-
schiedenen Rechtsordnungen angehören, daß sein Verhalten durch verschiedene 
Rechtsordnungen geregelt werden kann. […]
Der juristische Begriff der Person oder des Rechtssubjekts drückt nur die Ein-
heit einer Vielheit von Normen aus, die diese Pflichten und Rechte statuieren. Die 
dem Einzelmenschen korrespondierende ‘physische’ Person ist die Personifikation, 
das ist der personifizierende Einheitsausdruck der das Verhalten eines Menschen 
regelnden Normen. Sie ist der ‘Träger’ all dieser Pflichten und Rechte, das heißt 
aber—wenn man diese den Gegenstand verdoppelnden Vorstellung ihres Substanz-
charakters entkleidet—der gemeinsame Zurechnungspunkt für die als Pflichten und 
Rechte normierten Tatbestände menschlichen Verhaltens, der Mittelpunkt—gleich-
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For Luhmann (1984/1995: 430/315), the ‘person’ as a social form 
is, similarly, defined as ‘bundle’ of interconnected ‘expectations’. 
In the same way as ‘actions’ and ‘intentions’ are designations that 
are causally attributed to an ‘actor’,61 ‘the’ person, representing an 
‘ought’, is defined as a point of reference for the individualisation 
of social systems through a set of specific ‘identifications’ which 
are employed as ontologised predicates.62 The ‘different forms and 
sam—jener Teilordnung, deren Normen diese Pflichten und Rechte statuieren und 
deren Individualisierung sich durch die Beziehung auf das Verhalten eines und des-
selben Menschen ergibt. […]
Daß der Mensch juristische Persönlichkeit sei oder habe, das besagt letztlich 
nichts anderes, als daß gewisse seiner Handlungen und Unterlassungen in der einen 
oder anderen Weise den Inhalt von Rechtsnormen bilden’ (Kelsen 1934/2008: 64f.).
This, rather pointed, passage has only survived in parts in the second edition: ‘It 
is to be noted that a certain behaviour of this individual is the content of a legally 
established obligation and that by the statement that “an individual is the subject of 
a legal power” or “an individual has a legal power”, is only meant that, according to 
the legal order, legal norms are created or applied by certain acts of this individual, 
or that certain acts of this individual participate in the creation or application of legal 
norms. As mentioned before, a cognition directed toward legal norms is concerned 
not with individuals per se, but with their legally determined actions which form the 
contents of legal norms# (Kelsen 1960/1967: 169, cf. p. 173f.).
61. Luhmann (1990: 245) regards the causal attribution of actions to persons pri-
marily as a solution for the ‘problem of the overextension of the observer’ of social 
processes: ‘Die Zurechnung auf Person wählt aus, pointiert eine im Netz der Bedin-
gungen faßbare, benennbare Stelle, wertet eine Einzelursache auf und führt auf diese 
Weise Kausalität in ein prinzipiell zirkuläres Geschehen ein’.
62. The image of a bundle is similarly used in Luhmann‘s (1984/1995: 429/315f.) 
characterisation of the ‘social form’ of the ‘person’ in contrast to the social ‘role’:  ‘By 
persons we do not mean psychic systems, not to mention human beings as such. 
Instead, a person is constituted for the sake of ordering behavioral expectation that 
can be fulfilled by her and by her alone. […] With this […] distinction between 
person and psychic system, sociology can gain access to themes that until now have 
been reserved for the literary tradition […]: one copies a person as a model into a 
concrete, and therefore always distinctive, psychic system. […] We can assume that 
such problems and their literary treatment are first actualized when society needs 
and differentiates personality for bundling expectational nexes. What results—as 
can be read in the etymology of persona (mask, role, legal status)—is a differentia-
tion of person and role. Roles can, as distinguished from individual persons, then 
serve as abstracter perspectives for the identification of expectational nexes. To be 
sure, a role is tailored to what an individual human being can perform, but with 
respect to any individual person it is both more specific and more general. On the 
one hand, only a portion of a human being’s behavior is expected in the form of a 
role; on the other, the role is a unity that can be performed by many different human 
beings […]’.
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degrees of “personalisation” of social systems’63 can be investi-
gated, and the cultural models or ‘types’ used.64 Luhmann (1989: 
175f.) shows that the abstract (quantitative) ‘individual’ is indefin-
able in individual terms and therefore uses the notion of the ‘person’, 
defined as a social form: as a set of individualising features, i.e., idio-
syncratic properties, such as, which individualise the ‘individual’ 
by way of a string of multiple attributions: name, renown, inherited 
social status, rights, duties, relationships to others, social integration 
through mutual services etc. Luhmann (p. 178, 156f.) calls this pro-
cess ‘individualisation through inclusion’,65 because a unique set of 
dominant attributions tends to place each individual into a partic-
ular subsystem or social position. He regards this method as char-
acteristic for hierarchical social systems, arguing, in the manner of 
Simmel (1890) and Elias (1933), that the ‘distinction between body 
and soul’ makes this external individualisation through allocation 
‘bearable’ for the individual: ‘The semantics of individuality and the 
stratified structure of society were balanced’ through the practice 
of self-control.66 Functionally differentiated societies do not have a 
single overarching structure anymore, in which the individual could 
find its unique place in a relatively stable manner. The individuality 
of the individual is rather determined by its precarious position at 
the intersections of overlapping social circles, as Simmel (1908) has 
argued. Luhmann (1998: 158-60) calls this ‘individualisation through 
exclusion’ and argues, again like Simmel, that, because the individ-
ual is now excluded from society and its dependencies increase, a 
new ‘semantics’ of ‘qualitative individual uniqueness’ asserts itself 
to assume a ‘compensatory function’, by permitting the individual to 
retreat into an inner world that is not governed by causality at all.67
Bourdieu (1979/1998: 475), by contrast, regards the learned dis-
positions or habitus of an individual as a third intermediary realm, 
‘Plato’s “hybrid zone”’, between the individual’s irreducible individ-
ual features (biological and psychic) and social structure (‘structure 
63. Luhmann (1984/1995: 155/108f.).
64. Cf. Dilthey (1896). Simmel (1913: 119) considers ‘ethische Typen, die das 
schwere Problem: wie es denn überhaupt zu einem Sollen käme—durch die Relation 
zwischen individuellen und Allgemeinheitsfaktoren lösen wollen‘.
65. On the special case of ‘re-individualisation’ following monastic ‘de-
individualisation’ see Flügel (2018a: 240ff.).
66. Luhmann (1989: 180).
67. The renewed modern interest in meditation could be related to this.
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of social differentiation’).68 He was, in an oblique way, following 
Parsons (1951/1970: 229) who described those as the ‘social com-
ponents’ of personality, produced by the residuals or memories of 
past life, that is, acquired habits, prejudices, tendencies, etc.69 Par-
sons was inclined to the social personality theory of Thomas und 
Znaniecki (1918–20), ‘[T]he schema of social personality relates not 
to “psychology” but to the concrete individual, as a member of soci-
ety, belonging to groups and in social relationships to others’ (Par-
sons 1937: 30).
The Individual as a Social Form
The crucial result of the foregoing discussion of the sociology of the 
individuality in Europe is that under the impact of historicism, con-
cepts of the individual in the natural-law theories evolved into theo-
ries of dividuals, of multiple selves, of entities with specific structural 
patterns that can be analysed on the basis of self-observations and 
self-descriptions in literary documents and other contemporary or 
historical evidence. Most famous became the personality models of 
Freud (1923) and the modified version of Parsons (1952/1964: 23), 
which were universalistic in aspiration, yet proved difficult to align 
with the contrasting evidence from non-European societies.70 In one 
way or another cultural models of personality, sedimented in the 
literary heritage of the philosophical traditions of Asia and Europe, 
68. On criticism of the ‘heretical’ ‘doctrine of the triad’ (terāsiyā-vāya) in the 
scriptures of the Śvetāmbara Jaina tradition, which is structurally homologous to 
Bourdieu’s model, see Flügel (2012: 122-25). 
69. Like most sociologists in the Durkheimian tradition, König (1967/1977: 242) 
states: ‘There is therefore no independent collective consciousness, but only a perso-
nal consciousness with varied contents’: ‘[Durkheim] war sich im Grunde zeitlebens 
darüber klar, daß „die Gesellschaft das Miteinander der assoziierten Individuen“ 
ist. Damit erweist sich, daß eigentlich gar kein Gegensatz zwischen beiden besteht, 
sondern daß wir in unserem Bewußtsein Vorstellungen haben, die Teils auf unser 
Selbst, teils auf die Gesellschaft ausgerichtet sind. Es gibt also kein unabhängiges 
kollektives Bewußtsein, sondern nur ein persönliches Bewußtsein mit vielfältigen 
Inhalten’. See note 49. According to Luhmann (1989: 162) there are no special ‘encla-
ves’ of ‘social identities‘ within ‘psychic systems’ generated through socialisation, 
only episodic pocessess, ‘sequence structures’ oriented toward social models, which 
are integrated into the autopoiesis of the psychic system.
70. See the largely failed attemps to project Freud’s ‘universal’ model of the 
Oedipus-conflict into societies with non-patrilineal kinship structures and other fea-
tures that do not match the reductionist design of the model. See the reviews of the 
works on the Oedipus-conflict of Spiro, Obeyesekere, Goonasekera etc.
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can be sociologically related to social structure, either as ‘models for’ 
or ‘models of’ or personal ‘dispositions’ and ‘categories’ or ‘types’ 
created by and for social processes. To that extent, Dilthey’s research 
programme is still viable and incomplete. For Cartesian dualists, 
concepts of ‘multiple’ souls, ‘degrees’ of soulness or souls consti-
tuted of ‘fine-matter’, as in the works of Plato and Aristotle, still 
remain a great mystery. On the whole, Asian concepts of the indi-
vidual have not been studied in conjunction with similar European 
conceptions. Comparative philosophy is still in its infancy, largely 
because of reasons of disciplinary self-definition and institutionali-
sation. With the notable exception of M. Weber, much of the work 
in this area was conducted in the fields of comparative religion and 
social- and cultural anthropology.
Yet, from the point of view of Dilthey and his disciples, Simmel and 
Mead in particular, the different conceptualisations of individuality 
can be read as social forms as much as money was a social form for 
Marx, and analysed in similar ways. In the remainder of this article it 
will be demonstrated how the dualistic conception of the individual 
of the Jainas, an ‘empirical individual’ made up of physical features 
and dispositions that are interpreted as consequences of its previ-
ous actions (karman), and an integral self (ātman) which at the same 
time transcends and rejects these differences, can be read as antici-
pation of much contemporary European social theory, and, indeed, 
goes in many respects beyond it. Rather than representing esoteric 
material to be remodelled by externally imposed ideal-types, a new 
reading of the Jaina theory of karman as a self-referential system of 
action will throw a fresh light on theories such as Simmel’s, Bour-
dieu’s, Luhmann’s and Weber’s.
Renunciation, Self-Differentiation, and Quantification
Simmel’s (1890) stress on the historical significance of the devel-
opment of the concept of the individual self by early Christianity 
indicates that concepts of individuality are by no means related to 
a modern functionally differentiated structure of society.71 In fact, 
semantic changes are never automatically correlated to changes in 
the structure of social differentiation. This was highlighted by Luh-
mann (1989: 181f.), who pointed to broader structural parallelism 
and the indirect role of the psychic system as a condition for the 
71. See Luhmann (1989) and infra. 
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autopoiesis of the social system and vice versa. Rather than being 
the product of modernity, concepts of the self emerged in societ-
ies characterised by stratified forms of social differentiation, which 
they transformed in turn in their own image, a fact that was equally 
emphasised by Weber (1904–1905) (and Troeltsch) and by Dumont 
(1982/1986: 26f.), who used the Weberian term ‘other-/outworldly 
individualism’ as a label for conceptions of a world transcend-
ing ‘union of outworldly individuals in a community’ which he 
found not only in early India, but also in early Greece and in early 
Christianity,72 contrasting the underlying idea of personal transcen-
dence, like Weber, with the ‘inner-/inworldly individualism’ of 
Calvinism which inadvertently played a role in the creation of a dis-
ciplined workforce, prepared to labour for the job’s sake:
If I could draw a figure, it would represent two concentric circles, 
the larger one representing individualism in relation to God, and 
within it a smaller circle standing for acceptance of worldly neces-
sities, duties, and allegiances: that is to say, the accommodation to a 
society, pagan at first and later Christian, which has not ceased to be 
holistic. This figure—encompassing the antithetical worldly life within 
the all-embracing primary reference and fundamental definition, and 
subordinating the normal holism of social life to outworldly individu-
alism—can accommodate economically all major subsequent changes 
as formulated by Troeltsch. What will happen in history is that the 
paramount value will exert pressure upon the antithetical worldly ele-
ment encapsuled within it. By stages worldly life will thus be contami-
nated by the outworldly element, until finally the heterogeneity of the 
world disappears entirely. Then the whole field will be unified, holism 
will have vanished from ideology, and life in the world will be thought 
of as entirely comfortable to the supreme value, the outworldly indi-
vidual will have become the modern, inworldly individual. This is 
the historical proof of the extraordinary potency of the initial position 
(Dumont 1982/1985/1986: 100).73
Following Grotius, Simmel, was, next to Hegel and Nietzsche, one 
of the first to point out that, from a logical point of view, the divi-
sion of the individual into two spheres, a unifying concept of self 
and a multitude of empirical functions, impulses, interests, forces, 
etc., can be theorised as a consequence of a technique of monocentric 
72. ‘If individualism is to appear in a society of the traditional, holistic type, it 
will be in opposition to society and as a kind of supplement to it, that is, in the form 
of an outworldly individual’ (Dumont 1986: 26).
73. Cf. Dumont’s (1966/1980: 233, 419 nn. 118a, 242) earlier experiments with 
the model of concentric circles.
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rulership by way of politico-legal dissection of the individual human 
being resulting in a quantification of power. Simmel’s insight into 
the social and political consequences of the instrumentalization of 
specific aspects of the personality of subordinated individuals by 
superiors will turn out to be very valuable for the sociological anal-
ysis of the Jaina model of functional components of individuality 
based on a quantitative theory of karman or ‘action’. Simmel (1908) 
argues that the emergence of a sense of self, ‘of what each personal-
ity really is’, can be explained as the consequence of, as it were, an 
inner emigration, by some individuals, in reaction to political subor-
dination of the many by the one:
Rule-by-one has innumerable times been reproached for the contra-
diction which is supposed to lie in the purely quantitative dispropor-
tion between the one-ness of the ruler and the many-ness of the ruled. It 
has been accused of the undignified and unjust character of the ratio 
of what the two parties to the relationship invest in it. As a matter 
of fact, the resolution of this contradiction reveals a very peculiar, 
basic sociological constellation, which has important consequences. 
The point is that the structure of a society in which only one person 
rules while the great mass lets itself be ruled, makes normative sense 
only by virtue of a specific circumstance: that the mass, the ruled ele-
ment, injects only parts of all the personalities which compose it into the 
mutual relationship, whereas the ruler contributes all of his personality. 
The ruler and the individual subject do not enter the relationship with 
the same quanta of their personalities. The ‘mass’ is formed through a 
process by which a great many individuals unite parts of their per-
sonalities specific impulses, interests, forces while what each personal-
ity really is, remains outside this common level. It does not enter the 
‘mass’; it does not enter that which is actually ruled by the one individual. 
It need not be emphasized that this new ratio which balances the full 
personality quantum of the ruler with the many partial quanta of the 
ruled gains its quantitative form only as a symbolic makeshift expres-
sion. Personality itself is completely outside any arithmetic concept. 
Therefore, when we speak of the ‘whole’ personality, of its ‘unity’, of 
a ‘part’ of it, we intend to convey something qualitative and intimate, 
something which can be experienced only through intuition. We have 
no direct expression for it, so that these other expressions, taken as 
they are from a totally different order of things, are quite inadequate 
but, of course, they are nonetheless indispensable. The whole ruler-
ship relation between the one and the many and evidently not only in 
the case of political domination is based on this decomposition of per-
sonality (Simmel (1908/1950: 201f., emphasis added).
From this vantage point, the first steps of the development of 
the internally differentiated modern dividual are rooted not in the 
functional division of labour, but in despotic rule. Simmel’s main 
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argument is, interestingly enough, that the more internally differ-
entiated the individual is, the easier its desire for personal freedom 
can be accommodated to authoritarian rule. Outworldly individu-
alism is thus a technique of rule that enables the division of spoils 
between ruler and ruled to the benefit of both, without threatening 
the transformation of the asymmetrical relationship itself. Inworldy 
individualism by contrast is the individualism of the ruler itself who 
brings his ‘whole personality’ into the relationship without being 
forced to develop an inner world or to sacrifice any parts, that is, 
functions, to be able to continue to exist vis-à-vis the subordinated 
social mass:
It is one of the highest tasks of political art of church politics, family 
politics, politics in general to learn to recognize and, as it were, chemi-
cally prepare, those sides of man with which he forms the more or 
less leveled ‘mass’ and above which the ruler can tower at a height 
that is alike for all members of the mass. These he needs to distinguish 
from those other sides that must be left to the freedom of the indi-
vidual although it is only the conjunction of both which make up the 
whole personality of the subject. Groups are characteristically differ-
ent according to the proportion between the members’ total person-
alities and those parts of their personalities with which they fuse in 
the ‘mass’. The measure of their governability depends on this differ-
ence in quanta. More precisely, a group can be dominated by one individual 
the more easily and radically, the smaller the portion of the total personality 
that the member contributes to that mass which is the object of subordina-
tion. Where, on the other hand, the social unit covers so much of the 
component personalities; where they are so closely interwoven with 
the group as was true of the inhabitants of the Greek city states or of 
the burghers of medieval cities, government-by-one becomes some-
thing contradictory and impracticable. But this essentially simple, 
basic relationship is complicated by two factors. One is the magnitude 
or smallness of the subordinate group, and the other is the differentia-
tion of the individual personality. Other things being equal, the larger 
the group, the smaller is the range of ideas and interests, sentiments 
and other characteristics in which its members coincide and form a 
‘mass’. Therefore, insofar as the domination of the members extends 
to their common features, the individual member bears it the more 
easily, the larger his group. Thus, in this respect, the essential nature 
of one-man rule is shown very clearly: the more there are of those over 
whom the one rules, the slighter is that portion of every individual 
which he dominates. But secondly, it is extremely important whether the 
individuals have, or do not have, a psychological structure sufficiently dif-
ferentiated to separate, in their practice and in their feelings, the elements 
which lie within and without the sphere [204] of domination. This differ-
entiation must coincide with the art of the ruler, noted earlier, with 
which he himself distinguishes those elements within each of his sub-
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ordinates that are accessible to domination from those which are not. It 
is only when the two coincide that the contradiction between domina-
tion and freedom, the disproportionate preponderance of the one over 
the many, is resolved at least approximately. If this is the case, individ-
uality can freely develop even in despotically ruled groups. The for-
mation of modern individuality began, in fact, in the despotisms of the 
Italian Renaissance. Here as in other cases, for instance, under Napo-
leon I, the ruler was interested in granting the greatest freedom to all 
those sides of the personality in regard to which the individual does 
not belong to the ‘mass’, which are, that is, removed from the area of 
political domination (Simmel 1908/1950: 203f., emphasis added).
The functionalist theories of Parsons (1951) and of Luhmann 
(1964/1999: 24f.) take Simmel’s critical insight already for granted 
as the description of the universal nature of all things social,74 effec-
tively extending it from the analysis of the mechanisms of social sub-
ordination to all social systems, which, in Luhmann’s words, by no 
means include all actions of the participating persons: ‘Social sys-
tems do not consist of concrete persons with body and soul, but of 
concrete actions.’ Any individual generally participates in many 
overlapping social systems with one or other or one and the same 
action or aspect of its personality. It is the peculiar selectivity of func-
tions or attributes that distinguish one social system from another.75 
 The philosophical logic of Simmel’s model and of Luhmann’s 
system-theoretical reformulation is appealing, because both address 
the question of individualisation on a level of abstraction that is 
compatible with religious philosophy and permits new insights 
74. Cf. Habermas (1986/1996: 412): ‘Luhmann could then already postulate as 
trivial the fact that personal and societal systems build environments for each other’.
75. ‘Als Handlungssysteme gesehen, schließen soziale Systeme keineswegs alle 
Handlungen der beteiligten Personen ein. Sozialsysteme bestehen nicht aus kon-
kreten Personen mit Leib und Seele, sondern aus konkreten Handlungen. Personen 
sind—sozialwissenschaftlich gesehen—Aktionssysteme eigener Art, die durch ein-
zelne Handlungen in verschiedene Sozialsysteme hineingeflochten sind, als System 
jedoch außerhalb des jeweiligen Sozialsystems stehen. In einzelnen Handlungen 
kommen Sozialsystem und Personalsystem zur Deckung, als Systeme stehen sie 
einander gegenüber, bilden selbstständige Ordnungsschwerpunkte mit eigener 
Bestandsproblematik und halten sich gegeneinander relativ invariant‘ (Luhmann 
1964/1999: 24). Luhmann later rejected Parsons’ idea that persons are ‘systems’, and 
insisted that the ‘form of the person’ is merely a type of attribution of limitations 
of possibilities of conduct to the individual (Luhmann 1991/1995/2008: 142): ‘By 
persons we do not mean psychic systems, not to mention human beings as such. 
Instead, a person is constituted for the sake of ordering behavioural expectations that 
can be fulfilled by her and her alone’ (Luhmann 1984/1995: 315). He also switched 
from a theory action to a theory of communication.
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into aspects of the social implications of ancient Indian thought that 
have not yet been considered and vice versa. The investigation of 
the social implications and historical consequences of explanatory 
models such as Simmel’s or Luhmann’s and/or of Jaina philoso-
phers is a different question altogether. Simmel’s model explains, 
logically, how ‘the individual’, first inferiors, then also superiors, 
can be thought of as getting progressively ‘excluded’ from society, 
or rather excluding itself, in the pursuit of freedom. While superiors 
are instrumentalised by society with the whole of their being within 
the material world, inferiors retain spheres of mental freedom by 
way of selective integration, compartmentalisation and develop-
ment of an awareness of an inner self outside the material world. 
But has the philosophy of the self really emerged amongst subal-
tern elites? The superior herself, being totally instrumentalised by 
the group, may have even more reason to develop an inner world to 
escape to or renounce the world of householder-life entirely.
Sociology of Philosophy East and West76 
The main result of the brief review of contemporary sociological 
theories of the individual in Europe is that the quantitative notion 
of the human individual as a numerically separate entity, ontologi-
cally constituted by the relationship between a self and a body of 
homogenous metaphysical quality, was in the 19th and 20th centuries 
replaced by conceptions that took account of the historical unique-
ness of individual qualities by replacing the substance dualism of 
the rational theories of the soul77 by a hierarchical dualism between 
a unitary individual and its multiple qualities or parts. The principal 
argument of this article is that the Jaina model of the concrete indi-
vidual (vyakti), conceived as dynamic entity, composed of a single 
soul-substance (ātman or jīva) and multiple mind and body consti-
tuting factors, which are interpreted as the atomic material fruits of 
76. Cf. Collins (1989) for a, different, ‘interactional chain’ or ‘lineage’ oriented 
approach to the sociology of philosophy. 
77. Soul and body are variations of the idea of an individual as a ‘thing’. See 
n. 53. Luhmann (1991/2008: 141) argues that the essentially collectivistic legal 
concept of the ‘person’ was adopted by 17th century jurists in Europe to create 
conceptual distance to the theologically coloured body/soul-dualism of the tradi-
tional estates-based-society. Mauss (1938, 1986: 22) presented a different historical 
sequence, critically discussed and supplemented by Carrithers (1986: 235ff.), who 
focusses attention on the different histories of ‘mental and physical individuality’.
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past actions (karman-pudgala) of the embodied soul, is structurally 
homologous to Simmel’s qualitative model of the individual, which 
will be labelled the model of the ‘hierarchical individual’ for rea-
sons that will become apparent in Part Two of this article. In case 
the observation of a structural parallelism proves to be viable, many 
avenues for conceptual translation and comparative analysis will 
open up. Weber (1920-21) and Jaspers (1949) have already noted that 
in human evolution during the ‘axial age’ universal models of ‘tran-
scendence’, of ‘inner worlds’ and of ‘individuality’ were systema-
tised independently in various parts of the world where early states 
developed. Clearly, human beings confronted with similar struc-
tural problems and responded with structurally similar solutions, 
most details of which are yet to be worked out.
While numerous increasingly sophisticated studies of technical 
aspects of Indian philosophy and features of Indian culture now 
exist, comparative sociology of philosophy and culture is still at a 
stage of speculative exploration as far as broader patters of semantic 
evolution of the concepts of individuality are concerned. The signif-
icance of Indian philosophy for the comparative history and soci-
ology of the concept of the individual was already highlighted by 
adepts of the Durkheim school, such as Mauss (1938, 1986: 13), who 
noted that ‘India appears to me indeed to have been the most ancient 
of civilisations aware of the notion of the individual, of his con-
sciousness—may I say of the “self” (moi). Ahaṃkāra, the creation of 
“I” (je), is the name of the individual consciousess; aham equals “I” 
(je). It is the same Indo-Eurpean word as “ego”. The word ahaṃkāra is 
clearly a technical word, invented by some school of wise seers, risen 
above all psychological illusions […] esteeming that the “self” (moi) 
is the illusory thing’. Carrithers (1986: 237) ventures further, maybe 
too boldly, in drawing far-reaching conclusions from the single 
fact that in the form of Schopenhauer’s recasting of Buddhist and 
Vedānta philosophy ‘a conception of moi current in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Germany is essentially similar to views of the moi 
held in India in the fifth century bce […], [which] have been faith-
fully and easily translated into a modern European idiom’. This 
prompts Carrithers (1986: 245, 255) to amalgamate all ancient Indian 
philosophies of (non-)self that emerged in the mid first millennium 
bce in the context of ‘the rapid expansion of monarchical states and 
of cosmopolitan culture with an increasingly complex division of 
labour’ (p. 253f.) and all modern European theories of the self and 
the person, to be able to make the general claim that ‘[t]hese sorts of 
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complex society make available such rich and disparate experiences 
to their members that both moi and personne theories can flourish in 
them’, the more so, if moi and personne theories are in direct compe-
tition with one another, as in the case of Schopenhauer and Hegel.
The contributions of Mauss and Carrithers expanded in a heu-
ristic manner the scope of Durkheim’s theory of social differentia-
tion to ancient Indian materials and thereby helped building bridges 
between sociology and comparative philosophy. Prior to Mauss, 
M. Weber had attempted this already, on an ambitious scale, albeit 
with a slightly different thematic focus.78 Weber (1904–5) touched 
upon the question of individuation, but did not explore the ‘hetero-
geneity of meanings’ in greater detail.79 Possibly, he regarded this 
field of exploration as Simmel’s domain. How exactly the social 
implications of different notions of self and individual (which may 
be evident in one and the same (type of) society), can be fruitfully 
investigated and theorised remains an open question to this day. 
Only Simmel (1908), Dumont (1966, 1986) and Luhmann (1989) have 
seriously addressed the issue in general theoretical terms,80 based 
on the strategy of comparing generalised patterns of social differen-
tiation and general patterns of individual differentiation, to avoid 
the culturalist fallacies of socialisation theory altogether.81 Because 
of the structural homologies of Simmel’s model of the relationship 
of quantitative and qualitative concepts of the individual and the 
Jaina concept of the individual, his original insights may prove to be 
useful in this context, in the same way as the Jaina concepts them-
selves. But Simmel’s ideas are yet to be scrutinised in the light of 
the Indic evidence. The key question is, in which way models of the 
individual as such, whether philosophical or sociological, can func-
tion as social forms. A related question concerns the way in which 
such models change or are replaced. The fact that the Jaina model 
of the individual retained its significance in a virtually unchanged 
78. In the field of comparative philosophy Deussen (1894, 1917) had already 
published a work pioneering, followed by similar studies of more limited scope by 
Jacobi (1923), Glasenapp (1954), etc. The interest in comparative philosophy is only 
in recent years increasing beyond small circles of specialists.
79. Weber, cited by Lukes (1971: 44).
80. In a new footnote to the second edition of his work Durkheim (1893: chap. 1 
n. 12) describes Simmel’s (1890) work as not specifically focussed on the social divi-
sion of labour, but rather on the question of individuation: ‘il n’est pas question de la 
division du travail spécialement, mais du processus d’individuation, d’une manière 
générale’.
81. Cf. the output of associates of the so-called culture and personality school. 
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form over hundreds of years points to the necessity of taking a long 
view. Short term social changes evidently do not affect fundamental 
features religious models of self and individual nor their acceptabil-
ity. Why this is the case needs to be explained.
In order to theorise the formal links between social structure, 
cultural models of self and person and psychological structure, 
Simmel needed more than the model of the differentiation of the 
self, reflecting the structure of the social division of labour. Firstly, 
the relationship between the general concept of the individual and 
empirical individuality needed to be clarified. Secondly, the differ-
ences between distinct concepts of individuality and their functions 
had to be investigated. With the exception of a short article, ‘The 
Metaphysics of Death’, Simmel (1910) did not address the second 
question in any systematic way. In his late article ‘The Individual 
Law’ Simmel (1913: 150) made, however, interesting, now almost, 
but not entirely, forgotten,82 proposals as to how the Kantian conun-
drum of the indifference of the universal law (the categorical imper-
ative) towards the empirical individual can be solved through an 
individualised form of ethics that derives its ‘ought’ not from an 
abstract value-ideal, but from the objective qualities of the individ-
ual itself, that is, from an existential moral compass, ‘a third’ sphere 
or ‘individual law’, that is the product and impetus of the process 
of life itself. As a consequence of this perspective, every singular 
moment appears to be both unique as well as regulated in its eth-
ical aspects. Because even the universal becomes something singu-
lar, an enormous weight is put on the shoulders of the individual 
which as the sole master of its own fate has to find the right path for 
itself at any given moment: ‘The responsibility for our entire history 
lies in the emerging duty [Gesolltwerden] of every single action’ 
(Simmel 1913: 159).83 Because the process of individual life involves 
82. But see Podoksik (2011) and the special issue of Theory, Culture & Society 
2012: Georg Simmel’s ‘Sociological Metaphysics’: Money, Sociality, and Precarious Life, 
edited by Austin Harrington and Thomas M. Kemple.
83. Dilthey and Bergson evidently influenced Simmel’s idea, which in turn is 
reflected in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus: ‘Das Entscheidende ist aber, daß das indi-
viduelle Leben nichts Subjektives ist, sondern, ohne irgendwie seine Beschränkung 
auf dies Individuum zu verlieren, als ethisches Sollen schlechthin objektiv ist. Die 
falsche Verwachsung zwischen Individualität und Subjektivität muß genau so gelöst 
werden, wie die zwischen Allgemeinheit und Gesetzlichkeit. Dadurch werden die 
Begriffe frei, die neue Synthese zwischen Individualität und Gesetzlichkeit zu 
bilden. Die sozusagen technische Schwierigkeit, dieses sich in der idealen Sphäre des 
Lebens vollziehende objektive Sollen auch als solches zu erkennen, wird niemand 
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the totality of the life-course of the individual human being as a 
unique form of existence, not merely the inalienable ‘lonely’ core 
of the ‘deepest stratum of personality’ or the ‘intermediary strata of 
personality’, whose (alienable) sectors partly overlap with those of 
other individuals (154f.),84 the relationship between the historically 
overdetermined individual (the ‘soul’) as whole and the ‘singular’ 
act needs to be theorised. Simmel argues that the individual as living 
processual entity is constituted simultaneously by centripetal and 
centrifugal forces connecting the form-giving self-referential centre 
of the individualising entity with the all-encompassing ‘flow’ of life 
of which it is but a part:
Yet, the organic individual, striving to its centre with the same rela-
tionship that encloses its entire periphery, is at the same moment a 
part, a transit point, of a nexus that encompasses it. One can call this 
duality of inward and outward orientation, to the individual living 
form and to the trans-individual totality of life, the typical tragedy of 
the organism (Simmel 1913: 142).
He criticises the rational morality of Kant for ‘the extraction and iso-
lation’ of the individual action as such, without regard of the ‘rich-
ness of the empirical personality’ of the particular agent that has 
leugnen. Aber keine geringere droht, wenn man das Sollen unmittelbar aus dem 
Bestande extra-individueller Werte herleitet, die ihrerseits ganz ebenso der Deduk-
tion bedürfen, oder wenn man sie kurzerhand damit abschneidet, daß das subjektive 
Gewissen nicht irre’ (Simmel 1913: 152).
84. ‘Das Individuum ist der ganze Mensch, nicht der Rest, der bleibt, wenn 
man von diesem das mit andern Geteilte abzieht. Freilich ist in einem gewissen Sinn 
die qualitative Einzigkeit nicht abzuweisen und zwar gerade, weil wir festhalten, 
daß jedes einzelne Sollen die ganze Persönlichkeit repräsentiert und ein Gesamtle-
ben, mag es noch so viel mit anderen gemein haben, doch eigentlich eine doppelte 
Unvergleichbarkeit an sich fühlt. Einmal in einer tiefsten Persönlichkeitsschicht, von 
der ein jeder, unbeweisbar, aber unwiderleglich empfindet, daß er sie mit nieman-
dem teilen und niemandem mitteilen kann, die qualitative Einsamkeit des persön-
lichen Lebens, deren Brückenlosigkeit in dem Maße der Selbstbesinnung fühlbar 
wird. Und neben dieser sozusagen punktuellen, in das schlechthin Nicht-Extensive 
des Lebens zurückgezogenen Individualität gerade die des Gesamtumfanges unsrer 
Existenz: in vielen Einzelabschnitten dieser mögen Individuen übereinstimmen—die 
Totalität eines Lebenslaufes, mit wirklich allen äußeren und inneren Bestimmungen 
und Ereignissen, wiederholt sich sicher nicht ein zweites Mal. Die Bezirke der Ver-
gleichbarkeit, deren Inhalte überhaupt allgemeinen Gesetzen der Wirklichkeit wie 
der Forderung Raum geben können, liegen gewissermaßen in den mittleren Schich-
ten der Persönlichkeit; sowohl ihr Innerlich-Zentralstes, wie ihr Phänomenal-Totales 
hat das Cachet des Unvergleichbaren, des nur einmal Seienden‘ (Simmel 1913: 154f., 
emphasis added).
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perfomed it, leading to the construction of a pure transcendent I as 
its correlate (141). The categorical imperative severs the act from the 
agent as ‘free-flowing content’ to be able to judge it objectively as 
right or wrong (123):
The standpoint criticised here entangles itself with a nodal point of 
rationalism as such. […]: that the predicates of possible subjects can 
be detached from them and presented as independent-logical con-
tents. Between any two of those predicates one states a contradiction, 
an excluding of oneself—and believes then, that a subject, participat-
ing in the one, cannot possess the other one, or according to the rule of 
the excluded third, must possess one of them. […] As soon as each of 
the two sides has a positive meaning, it cannot quite be decided on the 
basis of their logical relation, whether they exclude or reconcile them-
selves with reference to a (logical) subject—but only on the basis of 
the concrete knowledge of the subject. Certainly, mortal and immortal 
are opposites; however the exclusion of the one still does not make the 
other valid (122f.).85
Simmel never referenced his sources, and hence was considered 
by his opponents to be a mere feuilletonist. However, he described 
the ‘normative’ relationship between the individual and its compo-
nents86 in terms which betray their inspiration from modern logic, 
that is the mereological aspects of theories of number by Frege (1884), 
Husserl (1887), and Bergson (1889). The exact mix of ideas that 
Simmel adopted is yet to be identified. His idea that an exhaustive list 
85. Luhmann (1989: 155f.) regards ‘the lack of the distinction of rules and 
actions’ as the sign of an ‘unsophisticated (einfache) society’. Yet many sophis-
ticated examples of the Jaina syādvāda method of conditional predication could 
be cited as historical examples to strengthen Simmel’s case. Suffice it to mention 
Mahāvīra’s reported dialogue with Jamāli in Viy. 9.33.2e (485b) on the question 
‘whether the world and the soul are eternal or not’. The ‘correct answer’ given is: 
‘both world and soul are eternal in so far as they never were not, never are not 
and never will not be, but that they are not eternal in so far as, in the case of the 
world, osappiṇīs and ussappiṇīs [regressive- and progressive half-cycles of the cur-
rent time-cycle], and in the case of the soul, the different stages of existence suc-
ceed each other’.
86. ‘What ever we take as a point, or refuse to take as further subdivided into 
parts, that we regard as one; but every one of outer intuition, whether empirical or 
pure, can also be regarded as a many. Every idea is one when isolated in contrast 
with another; but in itself it can again be distinguished into a many’ (Baumann, in 
Frege 1884/1974: 41). Cf. Bergson (1889/1910: 75f.): ‘Number may be defined in gen-
eral as a collection of units, or, speaking more exactly, as the synthesis of the one and 
the many. Every number is one, since it is brought before the mind by a simple intu-
ition and is given a name; but the unity which attaches to it is that of a sum, it covers 
a multiplicity of parts which can be considered separately’.
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of the attributes of a concrete individual can never be created seem 
to have its roots in the theory of Frege (1884/1974: 39ff., 1892/1986: 
27f./41f.), later adopted by Russell (1918/2010: 28f.) in his work on 
logical atomism,87 that names, colloquially called ‘proper names’, 
for individuals such as Socrates, are from a logical point of view 
‘abbreviations for descriptions’ of ‘complicated systems of classes 
or series’, that is, propositions asserting the unity of complex enti-
ties, which cannot be described exhaustively, in contrast to names 
‘in the proper strict logical sense of the word’ which, according to 
Russell, are designations that ‘stand for an actual object’. Like Frege 
(1884/1974: 39ff.),88 Simmel (1913: 118f.) asked the question how a 
general term relates to the individual factors constituting a concrete 
individual being, factors that can never be described exhaustively.89 
He comes to the conclusion that the relationship can only be aspira-
tional. In his view, the connection must be a normative, functional 
87. On Fechner’s influence on Simmel’s early logical atomistic world-view, see 
Böhringer (1976) and Podoksik (2010: 127): ‘It perceived the world as composed of 
small distinct particles, yet the distinctness of these particles did not imply their 
qualitative uniqueness. The qualitative differentiation of phenomena was produced 
instead by an endless variety of interactions between the particles’. On the history of 
philosophical and physical atomism, see Stöckler (2012), who, in line with European 
philosophy in general, overlooked the atomism of Jaina philosophy, influenced by 
Vaiśeṣika philosophy.
88. Frege’s (1884/1974: 66f./66f.) brief answer to the particular conundrum of 
the relationship between the entity ‘moons of jupiter‘ and its four parts offered (as in 
Jaina philosophy) a form of perspectivism: ‘Only a concept which isolates what falls 
under it in a definite manner, and which does not permit any arbitrary division of it 
into parts, can be a unit relative to a finite number. […] We can now easily solve the 
problem of reconciling the identity of units with their distinguishability. The word 
‘‘unit’’ is being used here in a double sense. The units are identical if the word has 
the meaning just explained. In the proposition ‘‘Jupiter has four moons’’, the unit is 
‘‘moon of Jupiter’’. Under this concept falls moon I, and likewise also moon II, and 
moon III too, and finally moon IV. Thus we can say: the unit to which I relates is 
identical with the unit to which II relates, and so on. This gives us our identity. But 
when we assert the distinguishability of units, we mean that the things numbered 
are distinguishable.’
89. For the ca. 5th century ce Jaina philosopher Āryarakṣita (ce 216.1-2), the 
most important binary (du-nāma) is the distinction between ‘genus’ (visesa) and 
‘species’ (avisesa), which implies a further distinction between ‘one’ and ‘many’, 
as the great number of examples, illustrating the method of taxonomic classifica-
tion, demonstrate. Rather than names of individual living or non-living entities, here 
names for types of life and of non-life are distinguished. See Flügel (2018a: 204f.). In 
his study of ‘The Notion of the Person’, Mauss (1938, 1986: 4-12) also first investi-
gates different naming systems.
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relationship between an ought and an is, from whichever of the two 
vantage points one looks at the relationship between the universal 
and the individual. The challenge is to conceptualise the form of a 
concrete entity which has to meet a twofold condition: to be an indi-
vidual and at the same time to be subordinate to a universal:90
The content of the general term, which designates a concrete thing, 
encompasses only certain parts, aspects, determinations of the thing, 
but many others, the entire individual configuration, all that pertain-
ing to the thing, which comes either under another term or cannot be 
expressed conceptually at all, the term leaves entirely outside of its 
content. Now there is however the peculiarity, that this term never-
theless stand for the totality of the thing, for its unity, including all 
determinations that are not affected by the term too. This can only be 
thought of in this way, that the term is as it were a skeleton, an inner 
schemata, which accretes those individual parts or qualifications, an 
inner form, which holds together all elements within the circumfer-
ence of the thing. The term is not only the logical minimum of the 
thing, of those properties which the thing must show at the mini-
mum, to be assigned a particular meaning; but it has that functional 
meaning, to impose a form also on all remaining, or more precisely: 
on the totality of all the real elements of the being—a form through 
which many diverse pieces of existence (Daseinsstücke) can circulate 
(Simmel 1913: 118f.).
The ideas of Dilthey, Simmel and authors such as Luhmann who 
they inspired seem particularly useful for the comparative investiga-
tion of Indian models of the individual, not least the Jaina theory of 
karman, based on the image of karmic particles, objectified fruits of 
action, flowing into the soul and forming the physical individual 
body to the degree of the active engagement with the world, i.e., 
the violence committed in acts of mind, speech and body. Before the 
discussion of the sociology of the indvidual in South Asia, and the 
detailed analysis of South Asian concepts of the individual in detail, 
however, Mannheim’s (1925: 115ff., 182) objection to the ‘romantic-
conservative’ and ‘counter-revolutionary’ nature of the qualitative 
90. ‘Allenthalben also, wo eine konkrete Einheit das Allgemeine zu einem 
konkreten Individuum ist, wo dieses von jener überragt, umschlossen, genährt ist 
und dabei doch noch einen spezifischen Charakter, eine Fähigkeit zur Spontaneität 
und einem relativen Ganz-Sein besitzt—da drückt das Sollen gleichsam die Span-
nung zwischen diesen beiden Seinsfaktoren aus; ob dies oder jenes gesollt wird, ist 
damit noch nicht festgelegt, sondern nur die Beschaffenheit und Lage eines Wesens, 
das unter der Doppelbedingung steht: ein Individuum zu sein und zugleich einem 
Allgemeinen zu unterstehen; einer solchen individuellen Existenz ist es immanent, 
daß ein Gesetz (welchen Inhaltes auch immer) für sie besteht‘ (Simmel 1913: 119f.).
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concept of individual freedom needs to be mentioned. In his view, 
the model deliberately ‘attacks’ the principle of political equal-
ity which is characteristic for the ‘liberal’ ‘revolutionary concept of 
freedom’. Although he personally had great respect for Simmel,91 
who was one of his teachers, he focused on his theory of the ‘ind-
vidual law’ as one of the prime examples of conservative thought 
which he associated also with the effectively politically ‘indifferent’ 
‘anti-Kantian’ intellectual movements of historism, phenomenology 
and the philosophy of life. Mannheim’s perceptive analysis of the 
social implications of the quantitative model of the individual and 
of the qualitative model of the individual exemplify ways in which 
models of the individual person can function as blueprints for dif-
ferent forms of social action. Whereas the ‘liberal thinker’ does not 
care about the inner life, and is solely committed to the ideal of the 
principal equality of all human beings and defines the limit of his 
own freedom in terms of the freedom of his fellow citizens alone, 
the ‘romantic thinker’ posits a limit already in the ‘individual law’ 
in which the individual finds the condition of personal possibilities 
and constraints. Mannheim sees the origins of the qualitative notion 
of the individual in the different freedoms of the estates-based soci-
ety of the ancient régime:
This freedom that is inherent in the nature of individuality is however 
typically romantic and in dangerously close proximity to anarchic sub-
jectivism. Even if the interiorisation of the problem is a conservative 
achievement (interiorisation of aspirations takes away the worldly-
revolutionising sting) and thereby as it were an external political anar-
chy is turned into an anarchy of inwardness (liberal thought does not 
care about inwardness and takes it as a ‘private’ sphere, and therefore 
poses the problem of ‘freedom’ always only on the level of public life), 
there is also the danger therein, that this interiorised anarchy becomes 
a danger to the state (Mannheim 1925/1984: 116).
The case in point for him is the strategy of the Stoa in antiquity, 
which can be usefully compared with the Jaina tradition. According 
to Mannheim (128), the tension between the universal and the con-
crete individual reached the maximal tension in this philosophical 
tradition. The fact that no ‘revolutionary conclusions’ were drawn, 
rested on the fact that the philosophy was perpetuated by a social 
elite, which was content with the cultivation of inner individual free-
dom while leaving the hierarchical social structure intact: ‘all of 
91. See Mannheim (1918/2012), where also European and Indian notions of the 
self are contrasted along Weberian lines.
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what exists […] was conceived as a compromise between the abso-
lute norm and relative circumstances’ (129).92 A similar approach 
to the relationship between precept and practice was chosen by the 
majority of the Jaina traditions. Yet, the political affiliations of the 
Jaina householders vary within a certain range of parameters. Revo-
lutionary action is indeed something that would put great strain on 
an adherent of the Jaina teachings.93
Sociology of the Individual in South Asia94
In the field of sociology M. Weber’s, L. Dumont’s and M. Marriott’s 
theories remain still most pertinent to the question of the role of the 
individual in the Jaina tradition, since it can only be meaningfully 
addressed from the comparative perspective which takes account 
the changing cultural milieus of South Asia and particularly the 
well-documented intellectual encounters of Vedic, Jaina, and Bud-
dhist thinkers. It is Weber’s and Dumont’s unparalleled achieve-
ment to have conducted detailed studies in comparative sociology. 
Interestingly enough, both authors pointed to the role of the ascetic, 
the world-renouncer as an important vehicle for the development of 
soteriological vision and the development of a doctrinces featuring 
the individual as a value albeit only outside the social group.95
92. Cf. two-truth theories, not least in Jaina philosophy, which play a role in 
such scenarios. 
93. See Flügel (2019).
94. For the use of the term individual see note 6. 
95. Numerous critics, such as Fuchs (1988), have successfully articulated objec-
tions against key aspects of both the ‘Weber thesis’ and Dumont’s work on ‘hier-
archy’ and ‘equality’. Particularly the ‘non-humanistic’ holism of the concept of 
hierarchy has rightly been singled out for scrutiny, for instance by Parkin (2009). 
At the same time it is increasingly used in anthropological studies of other regions 
of the world. See for instance Houseman (2015). Dumont’s (1980: xxvii) claim that 
his theory, which did replace Weber’s by incorporating his key insights, ‘has yet to 
be replaced’ is still valid. I have argued elsewhere (Flügel 2018c) that Luhmann’s 
(1984) arguments in favour of a replacement of holistic models based on traditional 
conceptions of ‘part-whole relationships’ by pluralistic models based on ‘system-
environment relationships’ are valid and worthwhile testing in relevant contexts, as 
are other communication-theoretical and perspectivist approaches, such as Haber-
mas’ (1980-81). The question how such a shift of perspective would impact on 
Dumont’s sociological theory of the individual in India will be discussed in Part 
Two. On this theory see for instance Tambiah (1981), Carter (1982), Davis (1983), 
Daniel (1984), Béteille (1986), Mines (1988, 1994), MacFarlane, Alan (1993), Celtel 
(2001, 2005), Khare (2006).
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The question as to the ways in which the religions of the individual 
and religions of the group interacted became one of the most signifi-
cant research programmes in comparative religion. Like Simmel and 
Weber, Dumont argued that the individual as a value (and its rela-
tionship to private peoperty) was theorised for the first time in the 
context of the religious history of Europe. However, like the schools 
of Dilthey and Durkheim, Dumont recognised the importance of 
social structural features and their important influence on cultural 
semantics, as did Luhmann subsequently.96 Overall Dumont recon-
structed the relationship between semantics of the individual and 
society from a structuralist perspective. The problem was similar as 
for Dilthey, who insisted on the significance of the socially irreduc-
ible individual will to determine what is unique about an individual, 
since most components of the personality—language, culture, and 
physique—are inherited from society:
A strange confusion: there is indeed a person, an individual and unique 
experience, but it is in large part made up of common elements, and 
there is nothing destructive in recognizing this: tear from yourself the 
social material and you are left with nothing more than the potential-
ity for personal organisation (Dumont 1980: 6).
Dumont (1980: xxxvi) commended McKim Marriott, his long-
term intellectual sparring partner, for the ‘genuinely structuralist 
viewpoint’ that ‘what happens within one actor is by nature not dif-
ferent from what happens between two actors’. In an influential arti-
cle ‘Hindu transactions: diversity without dualism’ Marriott (1976: 
109f.) formulated the hypothesis that:
96. The case in point was the platonic model of a parallelism between the hierar-
chical structure of society and the structure of the so-called ‘parts of the soul’. Whether 
Plato ultimately favoured the ontological principle of immortal spiritual freedom 
inscribed of the soul-body distinction over the perishable socio-psychological attri-
butes of embodied empirical beings is a matter of debate, on which see lately Crotty 
(2016). For Simmel (1908: 754f.) it was only the ‘contingency’ of Plato’s ‘political ten-
dencies’ and his ‘national Greek view’ that prevented him from bursting the barri-
ers of the ‘Greek form of the state’ by means of his ‘interest in pure individuality’. 
Luhmann (2005: 298) mentions Aristotle’s remarks on ‘parts of the soul’ but concedes 
that it is not easy to reconstruct, what he had in mind, because in the normative theo-
logical tradition the soul is treated as a single, indivisible element, an encompassing 
form, whereas here it is treated as sum of parts. His answer is that, today, depictions 
of part-whole relationships such as this, would need to be regarded as different tiers 
of description.
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[P]ersons—single actors—are not thought in South Asia to be ‘individ-
ual’, that is, indivisible, bounded units, as they are in much of Western 
social and psychological theory as well as in common sense. Instead, 
it appears that persons are generally thought by South Asians to be 
‘dividual’ or ‘divisible’ (Marriott 1976: 111).
Indian thought about transactions differs from much of Western soci-
ological and psychological thought in not presuming the separabil-
ity of actors from actions. By Indian modes of thought, what goes on 
between actors are the same processes of mixing and separation that go 
on within actors. Actors’ particular natures are thought to be results 
as well as causes of their particular actions (karma). Varied codes of 
action or codes for conduct (dharma)97 are thought to be [110] natu-
rally embodied in actors and otherwise substantialized in the flow 
of things that pass among actors. Thus the assumption of the easy, 
proper separability of action from actor, of code from substance (sim-
ilar to the assumption of the separability of law from nature, norm 
from behaviour, mind from body, spirit or energy from matter), that 
pervades both Western philosophy and Western common sense […] is 
generally absent: code and substance (Sanskrit puruśa [sic] and prakriti, 
dharma and śarira [sic], and so on) cannot have separate existences in 
this world of constituted things as conceived by most South Asians 
[…] (Marriott 1976: 109f.).
Marriott argued that from the perspective of South Asians trans-
actors, both the agent who transacts and the object that is transacted 
is thought to be ‘substance-code’ (śarīra/dharma).98 It is this both 
monistic and particularistic ‘belief in the non-duality of all such 
pairs’, their interrelatedness, that pervades ‘Hindu [sic] sociology’ 
(109f.):
All schools of Indian thought tend to agree that substance-codes are 
found in mixed conditions in this world and that the making of perfect 
separations, or purifications, is an almost insuperable problem (110).
(a) the particulate and therefore divisible, highly diverse nature of 
substance-codes, (b) the constant circulation of particles of substance-
code, and (c) the inevitable transformation of all natural entities by 
combinations and separations of their substance-codes (110).
97. Better ‘tendencies’ or ‘dispositions’. Cf. Bourdieu 1983.
98. ‘Whose sources he does not give’, Dumont (1980: xxix) adds, knowing very 
well that it is Schneider’s (1968: 28) controversial work American Kinship, which con-
trasts ‘emic’ ‘biological’ (substance) and ‘legal’ (code) concepts of kinship in Amer-
ica, which, according to Schneider, who in the second edition distanced himself from 
his earlier ideas, merge in the idea of ‘blood’ kinship. The general conceptual prob-
lems of substantialising thought have already been clearly articulated by Kelsen 
1960/1967: 173f. See n. 58 above.
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Marriott was trying to theorise karman in a contradictory way, 
Dumont (1980: xxxii) criticised, i.e., both from a monistic and from a 
transactional perspective. In this model ‘the empirical bond between 
representations and institutions is in large measure abandoned’,99 
in contrast to, say, the work of Weber (1916-17), who also consid-
ered institutional and ideological factors, arguing that the models 
of karman and caste were functionally complementary in ancient 
India. First, Marriott used ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’ as synonyms. 
Later he switched consistently from ‘Indian-’ to ‘Hindu thinking’ 
and adopted an ‘ethno-sociological’ approach which Dumont had 
already dismissed,100 with regard to the notion of ‘Hindu sociology’, 
as a ‘contradiction in terms’. Marriott (1989) in the end favoured an 
interpretation of ‘Hindu society’ that rested exclusively on his own 
interpretation of the perspective of Sāṃkhya philosophy, that is, one 
of the classical schools of Indian philosophy, which was presented as 
representative of ‘Hindu sociology’ as a whole. The fact that, philo-
sophically, the relationship between puruṣa and prakṛti, pure con-
sciousness and matter, form a strict dualism did not perturb Marriott 
at first,101 whose theory in fact only invokes different aspects of prakṛti 
which in Sāṃkhya philosophy encompasses the mind-body complex 
in ways unfamilar to modern European thinkers. Mind is regarded as 
a form of subtle matter subdivided into buddhi (‘intellect’), ahaṃkāra 
(‘I-ness’: conception of one’s individuality, self-consciousness, ego-
tism), manas (‘mind’: perception and cognition), and prāṇa (‘breath’: 
vitality).
These well-known facts are only recalled here in order to contrast 
the Jaina teachings with the ideas of the two eminent sociologists 
whose legacy still looms over Indian Sociology today. Evidently, 
99. This is also Spann’s (1914/1923) standard criticism of the approaches of Dil-
they and Simmel.
100. Mines (1988: 569f.) nonetheless categorises Dumont’s work as ‘ethnosociol-
ogy’.
101. In his response to critics, Marriott 1991: 302 softened his stance: ‘primordial 
puruṣa and prakṛti are no doubt a dichotomous pair in Sāṃkhya. But I notice that 
this (in Sāṃkhya) uncontested pair merges without a mediator, and therefore sup-
pose that their previous oppositional relation is conceived as closer—as being more 
like positive and negative degrees, or the directions up and down, rather than like 
the remoteness of heaven from earth’. Arguably ‘continuous variables’ such as the 
mind-body complex in Sāṃkhya (p. 303) thought of in terms of a subtle-gross matter 
gradation have been successfully modelled in ’western thought’ as well, starting 
with Aristotle, without muddling the lines. See for instance Hempel & Oppenheim 
(1936).
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Marriott’s both ‘monistic and transactional’ model mirrors Simmel’s 
view of the relation between the fluctuating empirical features of 
the individual and its relatively stable form. However, the Jaina 
theory of karman is more sophisticated than Marriott’s model, and 
arguably Simmel’s as well, because it combines an ideal metaphys-
ical soul-matter dualism with a model of the embodied soul as a 
living system. It will be argued that because of its dualistic ontology 
action could ultimately be conceived as detachable from the self in 
Jaina philosophy, as in Kantian ethics. In fact the Jaina case can be 
looked at both from the point of view the quantitative ‘individual-
ism’ paradigm and the qualitative ‘dividual’ paradigm, because the 
Jainas were probably the first school in India that, on a metaphysi-
cal level, posited a theory of the indivisible singular individual soul 
as a substance which can rationally control the physical composition 
/ decomposition of the bodies in which it is incarnated in a series of 
rebirths ideally ending in liberation of the soul from embodiment as 
such. The components of the body, aggregated by ideally progres-
sively refined karmic particles as fruits and seeds of qualitatively 
distinct actions, function as a means to the end of the self-realisation 
of the soul.
The Jaina case was only tangentially discussed by both Marriott 
and Dumont, so much were they focussed on the majority ‘Hindu’ 
society in India that was dominated by the Brahmins. A number 
of logical fallacies followed from that. Both Marriott and Dumont 
argued that the ‘modern individual’, though physically ‘indivisible’, 
is conceived of in terms of a dualism of mind and body, and under-
hand a switch is performed from a mind-body to a soul-body dual-
ism without further reflection.
In contrast to Weber, Dumont considers the individual in India 
only as a renouncer, but not as a lay-follower of the renouncer, who 
is incorporating ascetic practices to an extent into everyday life. Like 
Weber, he only broadly indicated the positive effect of sectarian reli-
gion in India on the economic sphere in a hierarchically structured 
traditional status order.102
The Jaina case, by contrast, demonstrates not only how an ethic 
of personal responsibility and an ethicisation and systematisa-
tion of conduct is motivated by Jaina values, outside the context of 
102. A positive role for empirical individuality ‘in the (South Asian) world’ of 
today is documented by Carter (1982), Davis (1983), Mines (1988, 1994), Khare (2009), 
and others.
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world-renunciation. It also shows that Jaina philosophy posits the 
integral nature of the individual self as opposed to the compos-
ite nature of the individual mind-body complex. It is arguably the 
only rational theory of karman ever developed which enables par-
ticipants to rationalise the pervasive but vague popular ideas of the 
exchange of metaphysical fluids through the notion of karman 
as a material particle, leading through religious competence to the 
desubstantialisation of dominant theories of flow or transaction of 
metaphysical substances as those cited by Marriott to underpin his 
theory of ‘dividuality’103 and hence a degree of freedom from social 
constraints.104
Vedic and Buddhist Conceptions of the Individual
The specific characteristics of the Jaina conceptions of the individ-
ual can only be discovered by studying them comparatively. Of 
particular importance are the well documented philosophical spec-
ulations of and debates between Vedic, Jaina, Ājīvika and Buddhist 
thinkers about the nature of the human personality during the for-
mative period of classical Jainism in the centuries after the death of 
Vardhamāṇa ‘Mahāvīra’ (c. 599–527 bce) up to the time of the com-
pilation of the Śvetāmbara canon in the 5th century ce.105
Oberlies (1998: 499 n. 192, 504 n. 214) identified four different 
locations that are perceived to be foundational for personal identity 
across cultures: (1) the whole body; (2) body parts such as breath, 
colour, blood, bones, perceived as ‘body-souls’; (3) ‘body-souls’ in 
combination with a ‘free soul’;106 (4) the ‘animistic’ concept of ‘one 
soul’. It was a mistake of 19th century scholarship, that is, E.B. Tylor, 
he argued, to project dualistic categories of ‘animism’ on (first by R.R. 
Marett so-called) ‘pre-animistic’ conceptions of personal identity.
103. Cf. Spann’s (1923) concept of the ‘Gezweiung’.
104. ‘If this interpretation is correct, it seems that in orientating themselves 
towards a ‘minimal transactional’ Jain ascetic code of conduct, and thereby de-
coupling themselves from the substantivistic underpinnings of the brāhmaṇ social 
system, Jain laity were enabled to become competitors of the brāhmaṇ priests in the 
social transactional sphere and also to engage legitimately in the maximisation of 
profit’ (Flügel 1995-6: 163f.). Indirectly, corroborating evidence is provided by Laid-
law (1995: 219): ‘A vow detaches the identity of an action from the intention with 
which it is actually performed.’
105. Traditional Śvetāmbara dates.
106. See also Bremmer (1983).
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The case in point is the Vedic conception of the person, which 
the texts depict as a composite of different forces or functions: a 
life-force (ásu or jīvá) (‘free soul’), which can temporarily leave the 
body, the physical body, made of bones, meat, organs, seeing, liq-
uids, hair, nails, etc., plus a variety of animating and regulating fac-
tors or forces (‘body souls’): breath (prāṇá), breath (ātmán), feeling 
(manyú), thinking (mánas), seeing ‘eye’ (cákṣu). Oberlies’s repre-
sentation of the complex and diverse materials was influenced by 
Arbman’s (1926–27) analysis of ancient Greek notions of ‘multiple 
souls’, which serves as the prototype for type three of Oberlies’ four-
fold classification. Evidently, the Greek sources tend to characterise 
the person also as a composite made up of, on the one hand, a so-
called ‘free soul’ which was believed to survive death, the psuchē 
(lit. blow, breath, etc.), and, on the other hand, a variety of ‘body 
souls’ which do not: thumos (impetus, emotions, etc.), menos (blood, 
impulse, will, etc.), nous (reason, intellect, etc.), etc.
Werner (1988: 76f.) pointed out that, in contrast to the soul-body 
metaphysics that permeates western thought about the individual 
until today, and some Indian philosophical traditions one may add, 
ancient Indian (and Greek) characterisations of the human person as 
a composite of elements and forces which ‘temporarily form a struc-
tural functioning unit’ are from one point of view ‘very similar to 
our modern conception of man’. They, as well, struggle, however, 
to answer the question ‘what makes the universal elements combine 
into an individual structure?’107 Werner emphasises that the elemen-
tal forces or factors that constitute the Vedic person are described in 
early Vedic texts as ‘gods’ (devatā) of intrinsic intelligence. After the 
death of an individual, they were believed to return to their abodes 
(‘mind to the moon, hearing into space, seeing into the sun etc.: ṚV 
10,16,3’ etc.):
Expressed in plain language, the Vedic man experienced himself as 
a rather complex being. He felt that he was a collection of elemental 
and dynamic forces which were by their character universal and were 
endowed with intrinsic intelligence of their own. Although they never 
lost their universal nature, they nevertheless combined to produce and 
sustain his individual being (Werner 1988: 76).
107. Werner (1988: 77): ‘What we do know is that we are self-regulating or self-
regulated structural units possessed of self-consciousness and composed of imper-
sonal constituent elements and forces which make up our bodily organism as well as 
our mental personality. Why it is so and how it came about remains unknown to us’.
258 Max Weber Studies
© Max Weber Studies 2018.
For the purpose of a reconstruction of the evolution of Hindu and 
Buddhist concepts of the person, Werner himself identified three-
tiers of the concept of personality in early Vedic texts:108 transcen-
dental, subtle, and gross (p. 79). The first tier is associated with the 
concept of ‘the unborn (aja)’, characterised as ‘the creative and sup-
porting force of the universe or of reality as a whole’.109 It corre-
sponds to the later Upaniṣadic concept of brahman. The second is 
associated with the notion of tanū (from tanú, ‘thin, delicate’) which 
is often translated as ‘body, person, self’. According to Werner it ‘cor-
responds more to the expression rūpa (form, shape)’ and is in most 
contexts best translated by the word ‘likeness’. Werner interprets 
tanū as a template for the constitution of an individual or person—
an ‘empty structure’ which survives death and as such exists for a 
fraction of time before being ‘immediately filled again by the cosmic 
elements and forces (devatā) which combine anew to make up a 
reconstituted or reborn personality’:
We may regard the ‘filled’ tanū as man’s ‘phenomenal self’ and the 
empty tanū as its base which transmigrates from life to life, not as an 
unchanging and indestructible substance or soul, but as a structural 
continuum which registers and preserves within itself in a coded form 
the imprints of the experiences, volitions and capabilities of the person 
as they occur or are developed (known in later systems as saṃskāras 
and vāsanas) (79).
The third tier is represented by the physiological organism (śarīra) 
‘made of four elemental forces (earth, water, air and fire—the four 
mahābhūtas in later terminology) which combine to form the bodily 
organs and are given their structural unity and outward bodily shape 
and likeness by tanū’. Hence the Vedic individual has not identity but 
is a function of a specific combination of universal dynamic forces and 
structures:
The structural configuration within the empty tanū-structure itself 
determines the individual pattern and mutual proportion of cosmic 
elements filling it and that is what gives the specific individual imprint 
to the universal forces when they form the subtle tier of a person and, 
as we shall see presently, this makes its mark also on the gross tier 
(79).110
108. Like the classification of Oberlies it is as it were a mind-body opposition 
framing the all-important intermediary categories or ‘tiers’.
109. ṚV 10,16,4; 10,82,6; 1,67,5; 1,164,6; 8,41,10.
110. This is not unlike Dilthey’s characterisation of individuality as a combina-
tion of universal components and idiosyncratic features, though Werner (personal 
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In the early Upaniṣads Werner identified four functional equiva-
lents of the early Vedic concept of tanū, the mere form of a person 
which ‘transmigrates’ after the death: (1) savijñāna, ‘he who is with 
consciousness’ (BĀU 4.4.2), to be ‘filled’ again with the qualities of the 
deceased’s knowledge (vidyā), fruits of action or ‘volitional tendencies’ 
(karmaṇī), and the sum-total of previous experience (pūrva-prajñā) 
forming dispositions for future action via desire (kāma), volition 
(kratu) and action (karma) (BĀU 4.4.5). (2) A ‘mark’ (liṅga) or subtle 
body which survives the decomposition of the gross body (BĀU 4.4.6) 
and seems somewhat connected to the concept of the mind (manas). 
(3) The eternal ‘name’ (nāma) or the core of individual character is 
understood to be composed by universal elements that are shaped into 
individual configurations (BĀU 3.2.12), and the individual embodied 
personality (nāma-rūpa) (CU 6.3.2).111 (4) The individual ‘living self’ 
(jīvātman), which initially may have been conceived as a universal 
force (CU 6.3.2-3) not unlike the interpretation of jīva (life, individual 
living being) as a transmigrating essence in Jainism.
In contrast to the later now stereotyped Buddhist non-self the-
ories, in the early Buddhist texts three elements are said to survive 
death and to be foundational for reincarnation: (1) personality (nāma) 
and mental body (nāma-kāya)—not to be mixed up with the visi-
ble body (rūpa-kāya)—endowed with personal controlling factor of 
cognizables derived from perceptions (manas), aggregate of empir-
ical consciousness (underlying personality) (viññāna <vijñāna>)112 
and the heart (changing sum total of individual characteristics) (citta) 
which, according to Werner, resembles Vedic tanū and Upaniṣadic 
savijñāna. (2) The reincarnating spirit being (gandhabba <gand-
harva>) in between existences (antarābhavasattva). (3) The liberated 
one (tathāgata, lit. ‘thus gone/arrived’, the uttama puruṣa). In later 
Buddhist texts, such as Mahānidāna Sutta, by contrast, there is no sub-
stance transmigrating from one existence to the next (Werner 1988: 
87ff.):
communication) was not influenced by it. Simmel (1957/1971: 224) echoes Dilthey (it 
is interesting to compare his statements with Jaina concepts of the individual living 
being): ‘Certainly, each individual is a synthesis of the forces that constitute the uni-
verse. Yet out of this material that is common to all, each one creates an entirely 
unique configuration. It is the realization of this incomparability, the filling of a 
space held in reserve for him alone, that is the moral duty of the individual. Each 
person is called to realize his own, his very own prototype’.
111. Cf. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BĀU) 4.4.2 & 4.4.5.
112. Words in <brackets> indicate one or more Sanskrit gloss for an original 
Prakrit term.
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Every living being, since it is a process, is [now] described as a flux, a 
flowing, a stretching forth, a continuity (santāna), or, more frequently, 
as a combustion, a flame. There is no ‘substance’, no ‘self’ or ‘soul’, 
underlying the process, unifying it. What we call the ‘I’ or the ‘person-
ality’ or the individual, whatever appears to be unitary, is in reality not 
an entity but a function’ (Malalasekera 1968: 66f.).
The historical changing meanings of the terms nāmarūpa (‘name 
and form’: living body, later: personality) and viññāṇa (conscious-
ness as carrier of life), in particular, in the early Buddhist context, 
have been re-traced by Langer (2001)113 and Olalde (2014). Following 
Frauwallner, Schmithausen, C.A.F. Rhys Davids (and Werner),114 
Olalde showed how in the later Buddhist Abhidharma literature the 
surviving ‘personalistic’ elements of early Buddhism were eliminated 
and replaced by the remarkably incoherent doctrine of the twelve-
fold dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppād) which replaced the 
idea of a transmigrating structural core of the person with a theory 
of the five constituent elements of being, or khandhas <skandha>: 
rūpa ‘bodily form’, vedanā ‘sensation’, saññā <saṁjñā> ‘perception’, 
saṃkhara <saṃskāra> ‘aggregate of formations’, viññāṇa <vijñāna> 
‘consciousness or thought-faculty’:
Since the narrow meaning of nāma still allowed its identification with 
the core or the essence of a person, it was finally reinterpreted and 
split into different constituents, first into vedanā, saññā, cetanā ‘voli-
tion’, phassa and manasikāra ‘attention’, and subsequently into the five 
khandhas: vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāras and viññāṇa. Thus, this reinterpreta-
tion of viññāṇa as a transmigrating entity was eventually replaced by 
the sixfold perception’ (Olalde 2014: 156).115
113. Frauwallner (1953, I: 206) had already pointed out that in time rūpa became 
a designation for physicality and nāma a designation of psychic factors which, apart 
from perception, constitute the worldly personality: ‘Daraus ergibt sich nun eine 
Umschreibung der Person mit den Begriffen nāman, rūpa und viññāṇa, welche dann 
im Laufe der Zeit mit dem Konzept der fünf khandas in einer Weise in Einklang 
gebracht wurde, daß nāman die drei übrigen khanda (vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra)—
oder sogar auch viññāṇa—einbegreifend verstanden wurde’ (Langer 2001: 26f.).
114. See also Hamilton 1996 and others.
115. See also Malalasekera 1968: 66f. ‘In this analysis, the human being was found 
to consist of two parts, rūpa and nāma, loosely translated as corporeality (matter) and 
mind, rūpa representing the physical elements and nāma the mental ones. Matter is 
composed of four ‘elementary qualities of extension, cohesion, caloricity (tempera-
ture), and vibration. The mental elements are similarly divided into four groups: 
feelings, sensations, or ‘receptions’ (vedanās); ‘perceptions’ or ideas (saññās); ‘mental 
activities’, ‘complexes’, ‘confections’, consciousnesses (viññāṇas). Matter (rūpa) and 
these four divisions of mind (nāma) are never found singly but only in conglomera-
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Like Werner (1988: 87), both Langer (2001) and Olalde (2014: 52) 
highlight the uneven and ‘highly polysemous’ nature of the sources 
and of key terms such as nāmarūpa (which in Buddhist texts can 
refer both to a ‘designation’ of an object or a ‘proper name’ of an indi-
vidual or an identity (p. 156), which do not lend themselves easily 
to consistent interpretations (p. 154).116 Significant for the explora-
tion of the links between the Vedic, Buddhist and Jaina traditions is 
Olalde observation that in some passages of the Vedic corpus, such 
as BĀU 1.6.1 and 1.5.21, nāman is connected not with rūpa but with 
karman, or action (function), with whom nāma and rūpa occasion-
ally form a triad in Vedic texts: nama, rūpa, and karma (p. 36).117
The twofold conclusion of Werner (1988) as well as Oberlies 
(1998), that the stereotypical ‘animist’ dualism of the textbooks can 
neither be found in Vedic nor in Buddhist conceptions of the indi-
vidual person, and that conceptions of transmigrating structures of 
personality can be found in both Vedic an early Buddhist texts, is 
stating the obvious and widely shared:
The likely reason for the fact that the Vedic and Buddhist con-
ceptions of the composite person appear to be similar have been 
outlined by Schrader (1902: 5f.), who pointed out that the Bud-
dha’s rejection of the idea of the soul as a thing-like substance held 
by contemporary philosophers, foremost amongst them the Jaina, 
cannot be maintained, because everything in this world is in flux, 
had led him to the conclusion, not unlike European philosophers 
much later, that the ‘soul’ (attā) is nothing but a composite of mate-
rial processes. What remains as the core of the individual living 
being is merely the ‘thirst for life’ (taṇhā):
Since the ātman of the Upaniṣads is not the individual transmigrat-
ing kernel of the human personality, its inclusion in or omission from 
the theory of personality does not make any difference whatsoever to 
tions or aggregates (khandhas). The five aggregates together constitute what is called 
the ‘I’ or ‘personality’ or the ‘individual’. The aggregates are not parts or pieces of 
the individual but phases or forms of development, something like the shape, color, 
and smell of a flower. Even the sense-organs and the organs of the body are like-
wise really forms of development or manifestations, since they all originate from one 
common source. There is no ‘stuff’ or substratum as such but only manifestations, 
energies, activities, processes. In Buddhist thought, to speak of matter as apart from 
energy would be like speaking of one side of a sheet of paper imagined by itself’.
116. Werner’s theory has not been taken up, not even by Langer and Olalde. It is 
therefore worthwhile reconsidering.
117. ‘Wurde im ṚV der Name mit einem Teilaspekt oder Charakterzug gleichge-
setzt, so tritt er nun als partikulare Funktion auf’ (Olalde 2015: 36).
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the notion of personal identity and continuity from life to life. Nei-
ther Hinduism, nor Buddhism posits an abiding, unchanging, purely 
individual soul inhabiting the personality structure and therefore the 
Upaniṣadic assertion of the ātman and the Buddhist arguable negation 
of attā do not justify or substantiate the view, still perpetuated in some 
quarters, that Hinduism believes in a transmigrating soul while Bud-
dhism denies it (Werner 1988: 95).
Part 2 of this article will appear in a later issue of Max Weber 
Studies.
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